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Mindfulness—as a state, trait, process, type of meditation, and intervention has proven
to be beneficial across a diverse group of psychological disorders as well as for general
stress reduction. Yet, there remains a lack of clarity in the operationalization of this
construct, and underlying mechanisms. Here, we provide an integrative theoretical
framework and systems-based neurobiological model that explains the mechanisms by
which mindfulness reduces biases related to self-processing and creates a sustainable
healthy mind. Mindfulness is described through systematic mental training that develops
meta-awareness (self-awareness), an ability to effectively modulate one’s behavior
(self-regulation), and a positive relationship between self and other that transcends
self-focused needs and increases prosocial characteristics (self-transcendence). This
framework of self-awareness, -regulation, and -transcendence (S-ART) illustrates a
method for becoming aware of the conditions that cause (and remove) distortions
or biases. The development of S-ART through meditation is proposed to modulate
self-specifying and narrative self-networks through an integrative fronto-parietal control
network. Relevant perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral neuropsychological
processes are highlighted as supporting mechanisms for S-ART, including intention
and motivation, attention regulation, emotion regulation, extinction and reconsolidation,
prosociality, non-attachment, and decentering. The S-ART framework and neurobiological
model is based on our growing understanding of the mechanisms for neurocognition,
empirical literature, and through dismantling the specific meditation practices thought
to cultivate mindfulness. The proposed framework will inform future research in the
contemplative sciences and target specific areas for development in the treatment of
psychological disorders.
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“To study the Way is to study the self. To study the self is to forget
the self. To forget the self is to be enlightened by all things. To be
enlightened by all things is to remove the barriers between one’s self
and others.” (Dogen, 2002)
INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, the concept of mindfulness as a state,
trait, process, and intervention has been successfully adapted
in contexts of clinical health and psychology, especially with
relation to treating stress and targeting emotion dysregulation.
Operationalizing mindfulness has been somewhat challenging
given the plurality of cultural traditions from which the con-
cept originates, the difficulty with which it is measured, and its
distinction from its common usage [see Baer (2003); Dimidjian
and Linehan (2003); Brown and Ryan (2004); Grossman (2008);
Gethin (2011)].
Generally speaking, there are two models for cultivating mind-
fulness in the context of meditation practice—a 2500-year old
historical model that is rooted in Buddhist science and a 25-year
old contemporary model that is heavily influenced by Jon Kabat-
Zinn’s Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) course, an
adaptation of specific Buddhist techniques intended for general
stress reduction (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). The historical model for
training the mind has similar goals to the contemporary west-
ern medical model: both are interested in reducing suffering,
enhancing positive emotions, and improving quality of life.
Although the contemporary view of the concept, “mindful-
ness” is increasingly becoming part of popular culture, there
remains no single “correct” or “authoritative version” of mindful-
ness and the concept is often trivialized and conflated with many
common interpretations. Mindfulness is described as (1) A tem-
porary state of non-judgmental, non-reactive, present-centered
attention and awareness that is cultivated during meditation
practice; (2) An enduring trait that can be described as a dispo-
sitional pattern of cognition, emotion, or behavioral tendency;
(3) A meditation practice; (4) An intervention. Dispositional
mindfulness is now measured by at least eight self-report scales
that are often uncorrelated with each other (Grossman and Van
Dam, 2011). These semantic differences are problematic in the
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laboratory setting. Here we attempt to address this conceptual
problem by synthesizing a comprehensive conceptual framework
of self-processing in the context of neurobiological mechanisms
by which mindfulness functions and that focuses on the goals of
mindfulness-based meditation practice: to reduce suffering and
create a sustainable healthy mind.
The proposed framework for understanding mindfulness
focuses on self-processing and the underlying neural sys-
tems involved in self-awareness, -regulation, and -transcendence
(S-ART). Different approaches to understanding mindfulness
may focus on one aspect more than another—S-ART attempts
to synthesize a unified framework that integrates the traditional
Buddhist and contemporary models. The S-ART framework
operates using the underlying premise that our perception, cog-
nitions, and emotions related to our ordinary experiences can be
distorted or biased to varying degrees. Depending on certain dis-
positional factors, these biases are sometimes pathological, but
exist on a spectrum and may therefore be present without any
clear psychopathology. Within this framework, mindfulness is
described to reduce such biases through specific forms of mental
training that develop meta-awareness of self (self-awareness), an
ability to effectively manage or alter one’s responses and impulses
(self-regulation), and the development of a positive relationship
between self and other that transcends self-focused needs and
increases prosocial characteristics (self-transcendence). In sup-
port of S-ART, six neurocognitive component mechanisms that
are highly integrated and strengthened together through inten-
tional mental strategies underlying the practice and cultivation
of mindfulness are proposed to modulate networks of self-
processing and reduce bias. These mechanisms include intention
andmotivation, attention and emotion regulation, extinction and
reconsolidation, prosociality, non-attachment, and de-centering.
Thus, rather than reducing mindfulness down to a unitary
dimension, the S-ART describes mindfulness in a broader frame-
work of perceptual, physiological, cognitive, emotional, and
behavioral component processes.
OPERATIONALIZINGMINDFULNESS—INTEGRATING THE
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES
DEFINING MEDITATION AND MINDFULNESS FROM THE HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
In the historical Buddhist context, the term meditation is used to
translate the Sanskrit term bhävana and its Tibetan equivalent
sgoms. Etymologically, the Sanskrit term connotes the notion of
“cultivation,” or “causing to become” and the Tibetan equivalent,
refers to “development of familiarity” (Thera, 1962; Rahula, 1974;
Bodhi, 1999; Jinpa, 2009). In light of these definitions, it should
be clear that a traditional emphasis of most meditation practice
is that of mental development, in which the practitioner is culti-
vating a general sense of well-being and virtue along with a level
of deep familiarity with one’s inner mental landscape, and one’s
patterns of behavior (i.e., nature of mind) (Rahula, 1974; Bodhi,
1999; Wallace, 2011).
One of the original translations of sati into the English word,
mindfulness, was by Davids (1882). It was translated from the
Pali root, sati (Sanskrit: smr. ti), literally meaning “memory,” and
closely related to the verb, sarati, referring to the process, “to
remember.” Most conceptualizations of mindfulness from the
Buddhist perspective emphasize a close and constant connection
between the functions of memory and attention (Thera, 1962). In
fact, on closer examination, mindfulness can be described as the
continuous discriminative attentional capacity for encoding and
recollecting experiences efficiently—without forgetfulness or dis-
traction, and in the appropriate context (Thera, 1962; Analayo,
2003; Wallace, 2006); however, from the classical Buddhist con-
text, views on the concept of mindfulness vary considerably
(Dreyfus, 2011; Dunne, 2011). The Satipattha¯na Sutta, one of the
most influential Buddhist texts, describes the practice of mind-
fulness as a direct path to the “cessation of suffering,” and as a
fundamental quality or skill amongst a set of mental qualities
developed through specific meditation practices (Analayo, 2003).
So as to avoid confusion, we refer to the attentional skill here as,
“mindful awareness.”
In the Buddhist context, suffering (Pali: dukkha) is related
to a lack of awareness for the following fundamental char-
acteristics of experience: (1) Habitual craving or attachment
(to sensory/mental objects we like) and/or aversion (to sen-
sory/mental objects we don’t like); (2) All phenomena (includ-
ing the concept of self) are impermanent (they arise and pass
away). The characteristics are thought to be based on an inflated
sense of self-importance or self-loathing (Thera, 1962). These
characteristics of suffering are incorporated into the more con-
temporary model of suffering illustrated in Figure 1, in which
habitual information processing biases reify a dysfunctional self-
schema. In order to reduce suffering, the path of mindful-
ness is described to specifically place great emphasis on four
particular tightly coupled qualities or skills which are devel-
oped through the prescribed meditative techniques, including
(1) A balanced intensity of effort and diligence (Pali: a¯ta¯pi),
(2) Wisdom of clear discernment or phenomenal clarity (Pali:
sampajanˇa), (3) Mindful awareness, and (4) Freedom from desire
and discontent (Pali: vineyya loke abhijjha¯-domanassa.m), a form
of equanimity. Equanimity (Pali, upekkha¯) is translated as “on-
looking” or “watching things as they arise” and is described to
involve a balance of arousal without hyperexcitability or fatigue
(Buddhaghosa, 1991). The application of equanimity involves
impartiality without bias or discrimination arising from a sense of
detachment from the attraction or aversion to ongoing experience
(Gunaratana, 2002; Wallace, 2006; Bodhi, 1999). Phenomenal
clarity refers to the intensity (or perceptual acuity) in which
each moment is experienced. Qualities like equanimity and clar-
ity develop over time along with mindful awareness, while one
learns to neither suppress nor fixate on what is arising in sen-
sory experience moment to moment. In concert with the other
three qualities, mindful awareness is thought to be critical for
improving access and insight toward subject-object relations,
such that the most fundamental nature of objects (including
the self) is perceived “as they truly are,” without distortions or
biases inherent in cognition (Thera, 1962; Brown and Ryan, 2004;
Wallace, 2006). This undistorted form of insight or experienc-
ing is also referred to as “bare attention,” perception without
interpretation (Thera, 1962; Analayo, 2003). The four qualities,
including mindful awareness, critically facilitate the develop-
ment of an advanced self-monitoring system that is the first
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FIGURE 1 | Reification of the dysfunctional narrative self based on
Beck’s cognitive triad—a model for psychopathology (Beck, 1976).
Dysfunctional attitudes, rumination, and negative self-focus reify the
self-narrative for the past, present, and future. The arrows depict
causal influences for integrating self-identity (“ME”) over time
and negative feedback in a dysfunctional narrative that leads
to affect-biased attention at both sensory-perceptual and cognitive
levels.
essential step to S-ART—gaining awareness of suffering as it is
described herein. Mindful awareness is also described to be specif-
ically applied in a comprehensive way across four domains of
experience: toward the body, toward feelings/sensations or affec-
tive tone, one’s current mental state, and toward the matrix of
interrelationships amongst all phenomena arising in one’s con-
sciousness (Buddhaghosa, 1991; Analayo, 2003; Wallace, 2011).
It is important for the reader to be clear that this histori-
cal description of mindful awareness be seen as a critical skill,
amongst others, developed in the meditation practices outlined
in Buddhist teachings. It is this combination of four qualities
along with the four applications of mindfulness that provide
the historical framework for mindfulness, as the path toward
reduced suffering and realization. Thus, our current framework
on S-ART reflects the qualities that are emphasized here in the
historical perspective and outline a skill set of processes that
co-arise with mindful awareness and help create a sustainable
healthy mind.
Emphasis from most traditional texts has also been on ethical
conduct (Pali: Sila) and ethical dimensions of mindfulness so that
actions along the path of reduced suffering continually remain
“wholesome” (Thera, 1962; Buddhaghosa, 1991; Bodhi, 1999).
Ethical conduct is based on the conception of universal love and
compassion for all living beings. This quality is reflected in self-
transcendence and the quality with which one brings awareness
to oneself and those around us. Furthermore, the ethical empha-
sis suggests the practitioner call to mind the various beneficial and
detrimental mental states in existence so that one does not forget
how particular patterns of behavior make one feel. Thus, one has
further motivation to show sympathy and compassion for those
around us who are experiencing negative mental states (Gethin,
2011). The ethical dimension is part of a constellation of positive
qualities that is evidently also necessary for the advancement of
the practitioner (Thera, 1962; Buddhaghosa, 1991).
The multi-dimensional skill set underlying the construct of
mindfulness we are attempting to operationalize can be also be
conceptually distinguished from the more familiar notion for the
flip side of mindlessness as described in other contexts of contem-
porary usage. For example, The Oxford English Dictionary (3rd
edition) defines the common usage of mindful (mindfulness) as,
“full of care”; heedful, thoughtful, and references the opposite of
“extreme carelessness” (Dictionary, 2002). Langer (1989) defines
mindfulness as “sense of situational awareness,” and emphasizes
that mindfulness refers to the active construction of new cate-
gories and meanings when one pays attention to the stimulus
properties of primarily external situations. She also emphasizes
that mindfulness can be attributed to cognitive flexibility, an exec-
utive function allowing for ease in switching set. While such def-
initions are distinctly different from the concept of mindfulness
as we have described it above, there is likely overlapping psycho-
logical processes between them. There is also a common practice
of “cherry picking” aspects of the meditation practices described
and adding it to a clinical intervention or an education curricu-
lum and calling it, “mindfulness.” Although there may be benefits
to doing such modifications, there are conceptual dangers for sci-
entific investigation of such modifications without qualifying the
use of the term in the particular context which it is used.
MEDITATION PRACTICES THAT CULTIVATE MINDFULNESS
Although there is a heterogeneity amongst styles of meditation
practice, the S-ART framework focuses on the two core practices
typically described as focused attention (FA), a type of concen-
trative practice and insight or open monitoring (OM), a type of
receptive practice (Buddhaghosa, 1991) (for detailed description
of the practices, see (Lutz et al., 2007, 2008b). The two practices
are outlined such that once the practitioner is able to stabilize
the mind, decrease mental proliferation (i.e., rumination), and
develop a fully absorbed state of concentration on an object like
the breath using FA, he/she can move on to OM and other more
advanced receptive practices that have no object of focus, but
rather are receptive to all other physical and mental phenom-
ena that arise (Thera, 1962; Wallace, 2006). The cultivation of
ethical qualities (e.g., loving-kindness, compassion, forgiveness)
through specific forms of meditation practices are also described
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to supplement these two core practices (Goldstein, 1976; Wallace,
2006; Lutz et al., 2007; Salzberg, 2011), support explicit ethi-
cal development, and has accompanied most mindfulness-based
interventions (MBIs). In combination, these meditation prac-
tices are thought to facilitate the development of S-ART. Each
process model illustrated in section “Mindfulness-Based Mental
Training: Methods for Adaptive Self-Functioning and Integrating
Self-Specific Networks Supporting S-ART” describes the over-
lapping component processes that are mapped onto self-specific
brain networks outlined for the S-ART framework.
It should be noted that some traditions have equated both
insight and FA practice with mindfulness and have referred to
these individual types of meditation styles as “mindfulness med-
itation” (Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Brown and Ryan, 2004; Cahn and
Polich, 2006). There is no rule concerning the ability to achieve
the desired resultant states through any particular order of learn-
ing these practices, or whether they are practiced simultaneously,
or through the practice of one method alone. Wallace (2006)
emphasizes that mindfulness is cultivated in Samatha practice,
and applied in the practice of Vipassana (insight), although oth-
ers (Lutz et al., 2007) would argue that mindfulness can be
cultivated in both FA and OM practice, a position we take
here. Samatha practice has 10 sequential stages of development
(directed attention, continuous attention, resurgent attention,
close attention, tamed attention, pacified attention, fully paci-
fied attention, single-pointed attention, attentional balance, and
finally samatha) that could foreseeably be examined indepen-
dently as one progresses in the practice longitudinally. The stages
are described at length by the eighth-century Indian Buddhist
contemplative Kamalashila (Lama Xiv et al., 2001) and also by
the Buddhist scholar Alan Wallace (Wallace, 2006). Only the
first four stages would be considered a concentration practice,
the later stages of practice correspond to deeper, more subtle
states of profound stillness and absorption (Pali: jhanas). Such
absorptive states cultivate an experience of non-duality between
subject-object relations, is thought to be experienced with joy
and elation, and is associated with strong decreases in craving
(aversion) for positive (negative) states. Jhanas also have states
of absorption that are progressive and potentially measurable
through phenomenological changes in experience of the medi-
tator. To achieve the 10th stage of samatha apparently requires
an exceptionally high level of mastery, which could take years
of training and upwards of 10,000 h of formal practice (Wallace,
2006). Other meditative practices can also be considered a con-
centrative practice. For example, transcendental meditation (TM)
centers attention on the repetition of a mantra; however, the
method places primary emphasis on the resultant states of con-
tinued practice related to an absence of concentrative effort and
the development of a witnessing, thought-free “transcendental
awareness” (Mahesh Yogi, 1995).
CONTEMPORARY DEFINITIONS OF MINDFULNESS
Contemporary psychology and psychiatry have adopted secular-
ized forms of mindfulness practice as an approach for increas-
ing awareness and responding skillfully to mental processes
that contribute to emotional distress and maladaptive behav-
ior (Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Bishop et al., 2004; Carmody, 2009). In
mainstream clinical literature, mindfulness has been described
as a form of attention that is purposeful, non-reactive, non-
judgmental, and in the present moment (Kabat-Zinn, 1990;
Baer, 2003; Bishop et al., 2004; Carmody, 2009). This concep-
tualization for mindfulness originally proposed by Kabat-Zinn
has been successfully incorporated into a number of evidenced-
based clinical interventions, namely MBSR (Kabat-Zinn, 1990),
Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) for prevention of
depression relapse (Segal et al., 2002), Mindfulness-based Relapse
Prevention (MBRP) for prevention of substance use relapse in
addiction (Bowen et al., 2010), Relaxation Response for cardio-
vascular health and wellness (Benson, 2000), Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy (ACT) for a wide range of psycholog-
ical problems (Hayes et al., 2006), and Dialectical Behavior
Therapy (DBT) for the treatment of borderline personality disor-
der (Linehan, 1993). The successes of MBIs have been measured
in terms of decreasing clinical symptoms and improving overall
mental health and well-being. The changes are based on the gen-
eral framework of a manualized 8-week program of meditation
and gentle Hatha yoga training, including 26 h of formal instruc-
tion (8 classes/2.5-h/ea.), variable amount of meditation time
at home (45min/day; averages reported of 246min/week), plus
an all-day 6-h class during the 6 week (in some cases half-day)
(Carmody and Baer, 2009). This contemporary form of mind-
fulness training is also encouraged to be used during ordinary
activities like walking, standing, and eating (Kabat-Zinn, 1982;
Baer, 2003). Although there has yet to be a systematic study of
the relationship between the magnitude of measured outcomes
and class time, a recent review of class contact hours and effect
sizes found that reductions in number of in-class hours does not
necessarily lead to compromised outcomes (Carmody and Baer,
2008). In fact, there have been reported improvements in clinical
symptoms and executive function in short-term training of spe-
cific mindfulness-based practices as short as three 20min sessions
(Zeidan et al., 2010) and changes in white matter connectivity
after 11 h of training (Tang et al., 2010).
In attempts to measure the psychotherapeutic outcomes of
MBIs, metrics for quantifying states and traits related to the
construct of mindfulness have been created. Dispositional mind-
fulness is currently measured by at least eight scales, items
of which were originally generated by psychology faculty and
graduate students reportedly familiar with the construct of
mindfulness and mindfulness-based psychotherapies (Feldman
et al., 2007; Cardaciotto et al., 2008). The scales include the
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale Brown (MAAS) (Brown
and Ryan, 2003), Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire
(SMQ) (Chadwick et al., 2008), Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale
(PHLMS) (Cardaciotto et al., 2008), Toronto Mindfulness Scale
(TMS) (Lau et al., 2006), Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory
(FMI) (Walach et al., 2006), Revised Cognitive and Affective
Mindfulness Scale (CAMS-R) (Feldman et al., 2007), Kentucky
Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS) (Baer et al., 2004), and
Five FacetMindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ) (Baer et al., 2006).
The FFMQ has the advantage over other measures given that it
was developed based on the items of five existing self-report mea-
sures. Factor analyses of these measures resulted in five facets
of mindfulness including (1) An enhanced capacity for noticing
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or attending to internal and external experiences (OBSERVING);
(2) An enhanced capacity for noting and labeling internal
experiences (feelings, images, and thoughts; DESCRIBING); (3)
An enhanced capacity for acting with present-centered aware-
ness rather than on “automatic pilot”—lost in the past or
the future (acting with AWARENESS); (4) An enhanced ability
to take a non-evaluative, non-judgmental stance toward inner
thoughts, images, and feelings and outer experiences (NON-
JUDGEMENT); and (5) An enhanced ability to allow thoughts,
images, and feelings to come and go without reacting to them
or getting carried away by them (NON-REACTIVITY). These
five facets have shown very consistent changes with meditation
training and symptom improvement (Baer, 2011). Each of the
measures has their respective internal validity; however serious
methodological and conceptual issues remain in the interpreta-
tion of changes on the FFMQ and amongst all the self-report
measures of mindfulness (see Grossman and Van Dam, 2011).
For example, there is a strong possibility for semantic differences
in understanding by responders, there is a variability in defini-
tions of mindfulness from the Buddhist traditions and amongst
the measures themselves, features of prosocial behavior or affec-
tive style transformation are not accounted for, and there is strong
potential bias in inventory developers and responders (Grossman,
2008). In addition, many of these measures rely heavily on
reverse-scored items in which an endorsement of the low end of
a trait scale does not imply the strong presence of its opposite
(Grossman and Van Dam, 2011). Although there is clearly bene-
fit in using these self-report methods, the aforementioned critical
issues should prevent clinical research from confirming the effi-
cacy of traditional systems based on these self-report measures
and provide caution in making claims about potential mecha-
nisms (Carmody, 2009; Grossman and Van Dam, 2011). Lastly, in
consideration of elucidating contemporary definitions of mind-
fulness, one should consider Jon Kabat–Zinn’s original intention
for using the term, “. . . (we used) the wordmindfulness intention-
ally as an umbrella term to describe our work . . . By ‘umbrella
term’ I mean that it is used in certain contexts as a place-holder
for the entire dharma, that it is meant to carry multiple meanings
and traditions simultaneously” (Kabat-Zinn, 2011).
To date, there have been relatively few attempts at operational-
izing mindfulness into distinct cognitive-neuro-psycho-social
processes or proposing a conceptual mechanistic model (see Baer,
2003; Brown and Ryan, 2003; Bishop et al., 2004; Shapiro et al.,
2006; Baer et al., 2009; Carmody, 2009; Fletcher et al., 2010;
Williams, 2010). These models have been mostly clinically ori-
ented and all have emphasized four major themes common to
many existing psychotherapeutic approaches [see Castonguay and
Beutler (2005)]: (1) a present-centered orientation of awareness;
(2) An attitude that consists of a constellation of positive state-
like qualities (open-hearted, non-judgmental; accepting) toward
thoughts and feelings; (3) a positive intention or motivational
component for clinical change or spiritual incentive; (4) devel-
opment of a form of decentering or psychological distancing
from one’s thoughts and emotions. More recently, Holzel et al.
(2011a) identified very specific component mechanisms by which
mindfulness functions, including attention and emotion regula-
tion, body awareness, and a change in the perspective on the self.
Herein, we expand upon these component processes by focusing
on neural systems of self-processing and mapping neurocognitive
processes that support mindfulness-based meditation practices
onto such systems.
BIASED SELF-PROCESSING: A CONTEMPORARY MODEL FOR
SUFFERING
The common thread that ties the historical and contemporary
models of mindfulness together in the S-ART framework is an
element of suffering and a distorted or biased sense of self, one’s
relation to others, events, and the external world. In studies of
attention to emotion in the general population or in a clini-
cal population, bias has referred to the tendency or extent to
which emotional stimuli with either a negative or positive valence
may be processed differently in comparison to neutral material.
Interestingly, one of the goals of mindfulness-based practice is
to make no such distinction between positive, negative, or neu-
tral valence and treat all incoming stimuli with impartiality and
equipoise. In relation to self-processing, affect-biased attention is
associated with distortions in initial attention allocation toward
momentary experience and/or subsequent information process-
ing that either follows immediately after an emotional stimulus or
is associated with real or imagined stimuli from the past or distant
future. The capture of perceptual resources by a given stimulus
is influenced not only by the characteristics of the stimulus itself,
but also by higher control systems acting upon the representations
of stimuli. Attentional selection is therefore determined by the
outcome of competition between these multiple and potentially
“biased” representations of the world and of one’s perception of
self in relation to the world.
Through either dispositional or experiential factors, atten-
tional bias can reflect facilitated attentional engagement toward
(or away from) stimuli that are contextually self-relevant (e.g.,
threat for fear-related disorders), or a difficulty in disengagement
from such stimuli (Cisler et al., 2009). While engagement refers
to an enhanced tendency to orient and select a given stimulus
or location for processing, disengagement refers to the process
by which selection and facilitated processing is withdrawn or
inhibited (Yiend, 2010). Facilitated engagement may translate to
hypervigilance or enhanced monitoring and artificially increased
perception of threat in everyday experiences, the consequence of
which is that all threatening stimuli (real or imagined) attract
attention, consuming resources and affecting sensory-perceptual
systems before there is full subjective awareness (Mathews and
Mackintosh, 1998). On the other hand, avoidance refers to both
automatic and strategic forms of emotion regulation in which
elaborative or evaluative processing is reduced and threat value
is deflated. Disengagement delays are similar to what meditation
practitioners refer to as “mental stickiness” and describes our nat-
ural tendency to dedicate resources to an object of engagement to
the extent that few resources remain to capture any other per-
tinent environmental information until one is able to disengage
(“let go”) and re-orient. Over time, hypervigilance, avoidance,
and disengagement delays can become habitual, contextually self-
relevant, and highly crystalized sensory-affective-motor scripts
and schemas that dictate tendencies toward behavior. This form
of affect-biased attention has shown to play a major role in
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causally influencing and maintaining disordered affective states
such as anxiety and depression. For example, in one of the
most accepted models of psychopathology, Beck (1964) origi-
nally proposed, “. . . the processing of external events or internal
stimuli is biased and therefore systematically distorts the indi-
vidual’s construction of his or her experiences, leading to a
variety of errors (e.g., overgeneralization, selective abstraction,
personalization). Underlying these distorted interpretations are
dysfunctional beliefs incorporated into relatively enduring cog-
nitive structures or schemas” (Beck, 2008). Studies have demon-
strated that individuals with either a diagnosed clinical disorder
or a known vulnerability demonstrate affect-biased attention
that is contextually self-relevant (Yiend, 2010). Individuals with
such biases may not necessarily have apparent psychopathology,
but more likely fall somewhere on a spectrum of function on
which one extreme is pathological. Success of both cognitive and
mindfulness-based therapy relies on the removal of such dys-
functional beliefs and distortions (through different means). The
meditation practitioner, whom may not even be a risk for devel-
oping psychopathology likely has attentional or emotional biases
that are more subtle to detect.
The model of a psychopathological self-schema is depicted in
Figure 1 in which habitual negative beliefs about the self (includ-
ing their personal world and future), become reified through
the continuous reinforcement of a feedback loop of affect-biased
attention influencing subjective and behavioral symptoms and
vice-versa. Formation of dysfunctional attitudes incorporated
within cognitive schemas produce automatized, efficient implicit
memories, and motor programs that represent skewed informa-
tion processing from early perceptual stages to the cognitive inter-
pretation (Beck, 1976, 2008). When these maladaptive scripts
and schemas are active repeatedly throughout one’s daily life,
it can lead to rumination or mental proliferation, in which a
stream of mental events feed off each other with no connec-
tion to the original sense impression that initiated the stream of
thought. Ruminative behavior is often characterized as reducing
information processing capacity, producing general interference
effects with ongoing task demands, and impacting ability to
deploy top-down control (Yiend, 2010). This impact on informa-
tion processing capacity also colors the emotional tone of one’s
ongoing experience, reducing the opportunity for awareness of
one’s thoughts or patterns of behavior in response to particular
contextual triggers.
The reified representation of self depicted in Figure 1 has
a distinct pattern of perceptual, physiological, cognitive, emo-
tional, and somatic activity related to each context and each
time in which the self is actively engaging with the external
or internal world. At each repeated exposure to the individ-
ual contextual features of any biased self-schema, there is a
hypothesized non-conscious pattern completion of the entire
dysfunctional system that facilitates habitual forms of processing
and blocks novel interpretations about oneself (e.g., positively
framed memories and self-schemas) and the external sensory
world (e.g., efficient engagement and disengagement). Pattern
completion refers to the ability of a network to retrieve an entire
previously stored output pattern from a partially presented
input pattern, increasing synaptic efficacy (Marr, 1971). Thus,
a vulnerability or risk for triggering psychopathology becomes
progressively stronger over one’s lifespan (i.e., repeated negative
self-schema), suggesting a “kindling” effect, stoking a fire that
makes the reified self more difficult to change. The reification of
the dysfunctional narrative self (NS) illustrates the contemporary
understanding of suffering and the S-ART framework provides
mechanisms through which mindfulness practice can unravel the
cycle of dysfunctional attitudes toward the self and toward one’s
relationship with the world.
NETWORKS FOR SELF-PROCESSING THAT SUPPORT S-ART
The framework for the development of S-ART rests upon exist-
ing brain networks that support systems of self-processing. These
systems are proposed to be subject to modulation through
specific mechanisms cultivated by mindfulness-based medita-
tion practices and which are identified in the following section
“Mindfulness-Based Mental Training: Methods for Adaptive Self-
Functioning and Integrating Self-Specific Networks Supporting
S-ART.” The networks identified in the S-ART framework elabo-
rates upon past conceptualizations of self (James, 1892; Damasio,
1999; Gallagher, 2000; Legrand, 2007; Northoff and Panksepp,
2008) and distinguishes between two functional aspects of self-
specifying processes, (1) non-conscious sensory-affective-motor
processing, referred to here as the experiential enactive self (EES);
(2) an agentic, self-as-subject acting as awareness in the present
moment, referred to as an experiential phenomenological self
(EPS). The S-ART also distinguishes between self-specifying pro-
cesses and self-related processes, which refer to the evaluative self-
as-object, reflecting the autobiographical narrative reconstructed
from the past or projected into the future. This self-reflective
form of self-processing is referred to here as NS (Christoff et al.,
2011). Enaction, refers to the sensorimotor coupling between the
organism and the environment which guides embodied action
(Varela et al., 1991). The EES is conceptualized similarly to the
“the physical self” described by James (James, 1890) and the “the
proto-self” described by Damasio; whereas, the EPS is described
similarly as the “core-self” (Damasio, 1999). This framework is by
no means an exhaustive account of the nature of self, but is rather
a simplified parcellation that is relevant to scaffold our conceptual
account of self-specific processing and is susceptible to influence
by the practice of mindfulness.
There is now evidence for the existence of large scale neu-
ral networks for which the three mutually dependent systems of
self referred to here can be mapped onto both functionally and
with strong anatomical specificity. One caveat to consider in the
interpretation of these networks is that many of the identified
substrates do not have functional roles that are reducible to defini-
tive functional categories, but are rather contextually dependent
and operate on a dynamic, functional gradient which allows
for some functional overlap. Networks underlying self-specifying
(EES and EPS) and NS processes have specifically been shown
to involve functionally distinct, and potentially competing, brain
networks that can be broadly distinguished by their contrasting
roles in primary modes of sensation-perception, and attention
to the external world versus internally directed mentation involv-
ing long-term memory [see Buckner and Carroll (2007); Vincent
et al. (2008)]. At the core of these two networks are the dorsal
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attention system (DAS) and the hippocampal-cortical memory
system (HCMS), a component of the brain’s default network
(Vincent et al., 2008) (See Figure 2). The HCMS is described as a
task negative network given its anticorrelation with goal-directed
task performance; whereas, the networks identified as the EES
and EPS have been identified as task-positive networks given its
positive correlation with goal-directed activity (Fox et al., 2005;
Broyd et al., 2009). Furthermore, several recent studies show that
spontaneous activity within the DAS and the HCMS is negatively
correlated—leading to their being described as anticorrelated
brain systems (Fox et al., 2005; Vincent et al., 2008). The task-
positive network is functionally parcellated here into the EPS and
EES in order to account for the differences in phenomenological
representation of experience that is primary sensory-perceptual
awareness (i.e., EPS), and non-conscious processing (i.e., EES).
THE ENACTIVE EXPERIENTIAL SELF (EES)
The EES network integrates efferent and reafferent processes and
highlights the fact that representational content can be actively
mediating behavior while being completely outside the focus of
awareness (Roeser and Peck, 2009). Current research suggests
non-conscious processes related to self/identity involve repeated
associative conditioning of interactions between the body, the
environment, and the processes involving exteroception, proprio-
ception, kinesthesia, and interoception (Damasio, 1999; Legrand,
2007; Craig, 2009; Lenggenhager et al., 2009). Exteroception
includes the processing of information from all the five senses
(vision, audition, olfaction, taste, touch), proprioception—
the body in space, kinesthesia—the sense of movement from
musculoskeletal feedback, and interoception—the sensation and
perception from the internal milieu and visceral organs, including
FIGURE 2 | Self-networks and neurocognitive systems supporting
S-ART. This working model represents a parcellation of task positive
(self-specifying: EPS and EES), task negative (NS), and integrative
fronto-parietal control networks. It also represents the individual
components of the attentional systems and prosociality network purported
to be modulated by mindfulness. The substrates for six component
mechanisms of mindfulness within a framework of S-ART are also
represented. EPS, experiential phenomenological self; EES, experiential
enactive self; NS, narrative self; FPCN, fronto-parietal control network; FEF,
frontal eye fields; DMPFC, dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex; AMPFC, anterior
medial prefrontal cortex; VMPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; PHG,
parahippocampal gyrus; HF, hippocampal formation; RSP,
retrosplenial cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; Dorsal ACC,
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex;
VLPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; TP, temporal pole, LTC, lateral
temporal cortex; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; sPL, superior parietal lobe;
pIPL, posterior inferior parietal lobe; aIPL, anterior inferior parietal lobe;
nAcc, nucleus accumbens; VSP, ventrostriatal pallidum; dstriatum, dorsal
striatum; S1, primary somatosensory cortex; AIC, anterior insular cortex;
PIC, posterior insular cortex; sgACC, subgenual anterior cingulate cortex;
VMpo, ventromedial posterior nucleus; sc, superior colliculus;
BLA, basolateral amygdala; CE, central nucleus.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 296 | 7
Vago and Silbersweig S-ART: Mechanisms of mindfulness
heart rate, digestion, body temperature, and perspiration, among
others. The self-specifying sensory-motor convergence that is
proposed to contribute to the EES network can be localized to
a distributed set of interconnected spinothalamocortical regions
[including the periaqueductal gray (PAG) and parabrachial
nucleus (PBN), midbrain colliculi, thalamus, hypothalamus,
and posterior insular cortex (PIC)], all of which are known
to be closely involved in monitoring (orienting and tracking),
deciphering, and controlling interoceptive feedback at a non-
conscious level (Damasio, 1999; Critchley et al., 2004; Corbetta
et al., 2008; Craig, 2008; Northoff and Panksepp, 2008). Self-
relevant information first attributes some emotional tone in
the ventral posterior nucleus (Vpo) of the thalamus before
being somatotopically represented in the posterior and ante-
rior insula (PIC/AIC) (Craig, 2004). The insula somatotopi-
cally and hierarchically integrates salient activity and “feel-
ings” progressively in the posterior to anterior direction, where
non-conscious homeostatic and motor functions are mapped
in the most posterior aspects of the insula and more con-
textually based relations to one’s conscious experience includ-
ing hedonic, motivational, social, and emotional feelings are
represented more anteriorly (Critchley et al., 2004; Craig,
2009).
The EES also involves neural systems involved in prepara-
tory behavior and pre-motor aspects of goal-directed action
selection, many overlapping with the DAS. These non-conscious
enactive systems are represented in association somatosen-
sory cortices, the pulvinar, intraparietal sulcus (IPS), frontal
eye fields (FEF), supplementary motor area (SMA), pre-motor
area (PMA), cerebellum, dorsal basal ganglia, superior pari-
etal lobe, and ventral lateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) (Decety,
1996; Posner and Rothbart, 2009; Ashby et al., 2010; Gallese
and Sinigaglia, 2010). These functionally specified areas are
described to be tightly coupled in discrete networks of inten-
tional motor preparation and action (Haggard, 2005; Gallese
and Sinigaglia, 2010), early perceptual processing (Brown et al.,
2011), search and detection (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002).
Based on monkey lesion studies and neuroimaging findings,
the VLPFC is implicated as a crucial part of the circuitry
in which associations are made between sensory cues and
the actions or choices that they specify (Ridderinkhof et al.,
2004). Motor learning and procedural aspects of emotional
memory formation and expression are conditioned over time,
implying automatization and non-conscious enactive represen-
tation through repeated forms of stimulus-response behavior.
More conscious forms of specialization have been associated
with right VLPFC activity (e.g., response inhibition) and it
is likely that bilateral VLPFC plays multiple roles in both
non-conscious and conscious forms of processing, especially in
its integrated role with DLPFC, other motor areas, and the
medial temporal lobe (Aron et al., 2004; Dillon and Pizzagalli,
2007).
State-dependent, sustained functional activation of the EES
network is likely to represent embodied enaction to support
the phenomenological awareness of sensory and mental activ-
ity and regulation of attention so mind wandering is less fre-
quent. In a number of studies, experienced meditators (in
contrast to non-meditators) were found to have increased BOLD-
related activity in areas related to EES during FA/OM or similar
meditation practices (Lazar et al., 2000; Ritskes et al., 2003;
Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007). In a similar population of med-
itators, morphological increases in gray matter (GM) volume and
concentration were found in areas related to EES, including the
cerebellum, left SMA, thalamus, caudate, striatum, and parasym-
pathetic control centers of the medulla (Pagnoni and Cekic, 2007;
Luders et al., 2009; Vestergaard-Poulsen et al., 2009). Similar
findings have been found in long-term practitioners experienc-
ing a peak concentrative state using SPECT to detect cerebral
blood flow (CBF) (Newberg et al., 2010). One study found that
activation in EES-specific areas (right putamen, PIC) negatively
correlated with individual depression scores (Beck Depression
inventory), supporting a role for mindfulness in homeostatic and
motor function-specific regulation of emotion (Farb et al., 2010).
A few other studies have specifically found functional changes in
the striatum duringmeditation. Studies by Lou et al. (1999, 2005)
report decreased activity in the caudate during meditation, while
others report increases in the caudate-putamen (Lazar et al., 2000;
Tang et al., 2009; Baerentsen et al., 2010) and the ventral striatum
(Kjaer et al., 2002).
THE EXPERIENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL SELF (EPS)
Distinctions have been made in phenomenology and the study
of consciousness to portray a form of self-specifying experience
in which there exists present-centered awareness, and in which
the contents of awareness represented at the level of EES are
accessible to cognitive systems of modulation, control, and ampli-
fication (Block, 1996; Gallagher, 2000; Crick and Koch, 2003;
Raffone and Pantani, 2010). The EPS has been referred to as the
“minimal self ” (Gallagher, 2000), “agentic I”(James, 1892), the
“knower” and “core-self” (Damasio, 2010), all implying the sense
of being the immediate subject of experience in the present and
to taking a first person perspective (FPP) without reflection or
evaluation (Tagini and Raffone, 2010). The EPS is proposed to
be a form of higher order conscious, volitional awareness related
to exteroceptive and interoceptive experience. This includes the
immediate motivational, social, and affective feelings associated
with experience, along with top-down attentional control mech-
anisms found within attentional networks. Top-down processing
provides support for exogenous or endogenous forms of engage-
ment, sustained attention, endogenous disengagement capacity,
accessibility and storage of information, and executive control
mechanisms to regulate encoding, retrieval, and commands for
the expression of attention (Dehaene et al., 1994; Block, 1996;
Laberge, 2000; Botvinick, 2007; Legrand, 2007; Craig, 2009).
The right DLPFC and dorsal ACC have been thought to act
in an “executive” capacity for this system, such that they may
be responsible for vigilance and alertness—monitoring perfor-
mance or arousal levels and regulating them accordingly (Posner
and Rothbart, 1998; Raz and Buhle, 2006). Along with activ-
ity in the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), these structures have
been often associated with capabilities that involve modulat-
ing and maintaining response readiness in preparation for an
impending stimulus (Raz and Buhle, 2006; Posner and Rothbart,
2009).
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According to Craig (2008, 2009), the AIC represents an ulti-
mate “global emotional moment” of the sentient self at one
moment of time. The AIC in humans is unique in that it is
thought to integrate the higher order, social, emotional, moti-
vational, and cognitive components of subjective feeling states
through its strong functional and anatomical connectivity with
the ACC, ventral medial pre-frontal cortex (VMPFC), and lateral
prefrontal cortex (PFC). This uniquely human aspect of process-
ing high resolution interoceptive information places the AIC in a
strong position to handle phenomenological experience related to
conscious awareness and likely provides improved self-regulation
and autonomic control (Gilbert et al., 2010). Furthermore, AIC
activation has been repeatedly shown to be inversely corre-
lated with posteromedial cortex (PMC) [including precuneus,
PCC, retrosplenial cortex (RSP)] in functional imaging studies of
awareness and task-related attention (Craig, 2009). The PCC and
RSP have more often been associated with the NS network, sug-
gesting a mechanism for contrasting momentary awareness with
self-reflection.
A number of recent studies investigating neurobiological sub-
strates of mindfulness have indicated very specific changes in the
function and structure of the insula and its connectivity with
other structures related to experiential self-processing and body
awareness. In terms of morphometry, two cross-sectional studies
comparing GM morphometry between experienced meditators
(8 weeks) and naïve controls have shown greater cortical thick-
ness and GM concentration in the right anterior insula (Lazar
et al., 2005; Holzel et al., 2008). A more recent study however
(Holzel et al., 2011b) did not find such a change. Long-term
vipassana meditation practitioners (>6000 h experience) have
shown increased GM concentration in the AIC (Holzel et al.,
2008), and functional increases in insular cortex have been found
during mindfulness and compassionmeditative states (Farb et al.,
2007; Lutz et al., 2008a; Manna et al., 2010; Ives-Deliperi et al.,
2011). A number of MBI studies have demonstrated the func-
tional role of insular cortex in states associated specifically with
the EPS. For example, meditators using an experiential FPP (in
comparison to an evaluative focus) toward a group of valenced
trait descriptive words resulted in a pronounced shift away from
midline cortices toward a right lateralized network comprised of
the VLPFC and DLPFC. In addition, increases in BOLD activ-
ity were found specifically in right AIC, somatosensory cortex
(SII) and the IPL (in comparison to control subjects) (Farb et al.,
2007). Strong functional coupling was found between the right
PIC and mPFC in novices that was not present in the medi-
tators, who showed more significant connectivity between right
PIC and DLPFC. This suggests a fundamental neural dissociation
between critical structures related to interoception and evaluation
that are habitually integrated, but dissociated through medita-
tion training. Manna et al. (2010) found the left AIC cluster in
OM practice to be positively correlated with areas related to exec-
utive monitoring and attention in the left hemisphere (anterior
PFC and sPL, STG). Further studies of meditation have found
similar increases in right AIC activity coupled with decreases in
posterior parietal cortex and cortical midline structures (Creswell
et al., 2007; Holzel et al., 2007; Farb et al., 2010), while others
have found increased functional connectivity between areas also
implicated in present-centered episodic awareness (DMPFC) and
sensory areas (SI, SII) (Kilpatrick et al., 2011). Andrews-Hanna
et al. (2010) also demonstrated that a FPP episodic judgment
task concerning one’s present situation activated a distinct net-
work referred to as the dorsomedial PFC (DMPFC) subsystem,
including the TPJ, lateral temporal cortex (LTC), and temporal
pole (TP). There appears to be a role for this subsystem with EPS
circuitry and prosocial behavior. Another study found that inte-
roceptive awareness (in contrast to exteroceptive awareness) in
individuals trained in MBSR recruited decreased DMPFC activ-
ity and negative functional connectivity with PIC (Farb et al.,
2012), suggesting a critical role for DMPFC in modulating pri-
mary interoceptive areas. The precuneus is also involved in con-
texts involving a FPP, as well as visuo-spatial imagery, execution
and preparation of motor behavior, episodic memory retrieval,
and agency (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). Furthermore, the pre-
cuneus and surrounding PMC are amongst the brain structures
displaying the highest resting metabolic rates (i.e., 35%more glu-
cose consumption than any other brain area), suggesting a tonic
role in self-processing. Interestingly, the precuneus is character-
ized by transient decreases in tonic activity during engagement
in NS-processing or in default mode forms of rest (Cavanna
and Trimble, 2006). The precuneus has been found to be acti-
vated during FA > Rest, and in OM > Rest, suggesting it play
a key role in self-induced transitions between meditative and
discursive rest states (Manna et al., 2010). These data further sup-
port that mindfulness training facilitates volitional flexibility for
switching between the self as subject and object. Moreover, future
research will have to clarify how EPS networks interact with exec-
utive attention and primary interoceptive brain areas through
context-specific modalities of present-centered awareness.
In the context of pain, there has been mixed results in terms
of insular activity. For example one study of experienced med-
itators (39–1820 weeks of meditation practice), in comparison
to non-meditators, showed decreased left PIC and SII activation
in the anticipation period that continued through the experi-
ence of pain (Brown and Jones, 2010). In contrast, two studies
showed no difference during anticipation and stronger activation
in pain-related areas (mid-cingulate, insula, SII, and thalamus)
during experience of pain and while maintaining a “mindful
state” (Grant et al., 2010a; Gard et al., 2012). Greater bilateral
activation in the PIC, along with somatosensory areas corre-
sponding to the nose and throat, was found in meditators given
brief training experience (4 × 20min sessions) while practicing
FA meditation (Zeidan et al., 2011). Zeidan et al. (2011) also
showed decreased activity in the PIC and somatosensory areas
corresponding to the site of pain stimulus while meditating in
the context of noxious stimuli. Interestingly, right AIC and dACC
negatively correlated with pain intensity, while OFC activity neg-
atively correlated with pain unpleasantness (Zeidan et al., 2011).
These studies of acute pain suggest meditators modulate primary
interoceptive pain processing (in comparison to controls) during
pain experience and affective dimensions of pain processing are
diminished.
While most meditation practitioners often report having
enhanced awareness of body sensations, there is a paucity of
good evidence that they actually do so (Nielsen and Kaszniak,
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2006; Khalsa et al., 2008). For example, one study in particular
compared two groups of advanced meditators (Tibetan and
Kundalini practitioners; >15 years formal practice) against a
control group of non-meditators at two different time points
on a common interoceptive heart-beat detection task and pulse
detection task (Khalsa et al., 2008). During pulse detection, par-
ticipants took their non-dominant wrist pulse and were required
to judge whether a train of exteroceptive stimuli (800-Hz, 50-ms
tones) were simultaneous or non-simultaneous with pulse sensa-
tions. On neither task did the meditators perform better in terms
of perceptual accuracy. Given the sufficient power and control
of the study, it is possible that awareness of heartbeat synchrony
may not be a good general index of the type of awareness that
is cultivated by mindfulness training. Future studies will have
to examine more subtle forms of interoceptive awareness that
appear to recruit the left AIC, for example. Other sensory modal-
ities that are targets of the contemplative practice will have to be
explored as well. For example, tai chi practitioners have shown to
have superior tactile acuity compared to non-practitioners (Kerr
et al., 2008).
THE EVALUATIVE NARRATIVE SELF (NS)
The NS is an evaluative, reflective form of identification that fol-
lows experience in narrative form, described in some contexts as
the “Me-self” or “material me,” the sum total of all a person can
call their own across physical, social, or psychological domains:
“That looks like me,” “Am I a nice guy?,” “I feel anxious” (Brewer,
1993; Craig, 2004; Damasio, 2010; Tagini and Raffone, 2010).
The NS is also reflected in metacognitive knowledge, access to
knowledge people have about their cognitive abilities (“I have a
badmemory”), about cognitive strategies (“to remember a phone
number I should rehearse it”), about tasks (“categorized items are
easier to recall”), etc. (Flavell, 1979). There may very well be dis-
tinct substrates across each domain as there is likely distinct forms
of “me-self” in as many social relationships as there are individu-
als who recognize each one uniquely. The common feature in the
NS is an awareness of a specific object, “me” to which identifica-
tion with, and evaluation of, specific characteristics are made. The
recurrent feedback of self-identification embedded in cognitive
self-schemas perpetuates a stable sense of self. This is illustrated
in the dysfunctional representation in Figure 1.
The NS is mediated by the HCMS—a network of cortical mid-
line structures sometimes referred to as the “E-network” due its
evaluative nature (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Legrand, 2007;
Schmitz and Johnson, 2007; Legrand and Ruby, 2009). This net-
work includes the VMPFC, pre- and subgenual anterior cingulate
cortex (pACC; sgACC), medial parietal cortex (MPC), PCC, and
RSP (see Figure 3). Because of the dense reciprocal projections
with anterior thalamus and hippocampus, the RSP and MPC
both aid in the repeated construction of identity in time and
space through moment-to-moment episodic memory formation
(Peters et al., 2009; Spreng et al., 2009). Through interactions
between PMC and subcortical limbic structures (e.g., hippocam-
pus, amygdala), there is a progressive accumulation of an “auto-
biographical self,” a set of memories that make up the individual’s
unique past, current state, and expected future (Zelazo et al.,
2007; Spreng et al., 2009). The VMPFC is heavily interconnected
with the amygdala and ventral striatal pallidal complex (including
nucleus accumbens), supporting the representation of affective
and motivational states through a gradient of non-conscious and
conscious forms of affective appraisal. Through an interaction
with the sgACC, there is evidence suggesting a mechanism for
appraising the value of stimuli with respect to current goals and
decisions, while some data suggest a role in modulating emo-
tion and disengagement through executive control mechanisms
(Drevets et al., 2008; Roy et al., 2012). Increased NS activity
during goal-directed tasks is often associated with excessive and
repetitive elaboration or rumination, decreasing efficiency of the
attentional system and capacity of information processing in gen-
eral, further supporting the claim that increased NS processing
can lead to negative health outcomes (Brewer, 1993; Mogg et al.,
1995; Rimes andWatkins, 2005; Grimm et al., 2009).
A number of studies investigating forms of psychopathology
have reported decreased task-induced deactivation of the NS net-
work, suggesting increased mind-wandering and self-reflection
during ongoing task demands (see Broyd et al., 2009). A few stud-
ies on states of meditation have reported decreased task-related
mind wandering and increased task-related deactivation of NS
activity (Farb et al., 2007; Ott et al., 2010b; Brewer et al., 2011).
Some studies of meditative states have shown a similar effect
in the context of distraction, suggesting increased engagement,
and decreased mind-wandering and reactivity to distractions
(Anderson et al., 2007; Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Pagnoni
et al., 2008; Grant and Rainville, 2009; Farb et al., 2010; Manna
et al., 2010). Similarly, increased functional connectivity has been
found within areas specific to the NS network (e.g., mPFC)
and regions of primary interoceptive awareness of meditators
(∼1000 h practice) (Jang et al., 2010; Brewer et al., 2011), while
studies using the PCC as a seed found increased connectivity with
dorsal ACC and DLPFC at rest and in the dorsal ACC during
meditation (Brewer et al., 2011). These correlations between anti-
correlated networks may be interpreted as evidence for increased
integration and volitional control in recruiting networks when
contextually appropriate. For example, Josipovic et al. (2011)
demonstrate that such correlations are stronger during FA medi-
tation, but smaller during OM forms of practice.
Across a number of different MBI studies (Lazar et al., 2005;
Pagnoni and Cekic, 2007; Holzel et al., 2008, 2010, 2011b;
Luders et al., 2009; Vestergaard-Poulsen et al., 2009; Grant et al.,
2010a), increases in GM volume and density (in comparison
to non-meditating controls) have been found using voxel-based
morphometry (VBM) in hippocampus and PCC. Such changes
further suggest meditation training increases efficiency of mem-
ory networks related to the NS, forseeably providingmore control
over its expression. Increased GM concentration in the right hip-
pocampus has also been attributed to training in arousal regula-
tion, suggesting another mechanism for regulating the self toward
more adaptive trajectories of self-experience. The S-ART frame-
work suggests mindfulness critically involves working memory,
efficiency of memory encoding, retrieval, and extinction pro-
cesses, all aspects of hippocampal and parahippocampal activity.
These data also suggest an enhanced ability for pattern separa-
tion (transforming similar representations into highly dissimilar,
non-overlapping representations), inhibition of mental contents
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FIGURE 3 | Mindfulness process model—concentrative practice.
FA meditation using the breath as the object of focus is illustrated
as an example, but the processes are proposed to be the same
across concentration styles of practice. Intention is formed along with
motivation to practice before an executive “set” is created.
Executive set is supported by the working memory system in
order to implement and maintain practice instructions. Focused
attentional networks are recruited and sustained along with support by
component mechanisms including executive monitoring, emotion
regulation, and response inhibition. Unintended objects of distraction
can include any stimulus available to extero- or interoceptive sensory
and mental processes. Affective responses to unintended objects can
have a positive, negative, or neutral valence and are likely to proliferate
endlessly unless awareness and de-centering promote response
inhibition and disengagement. Motor learning provides a framework
for automatization and mindfulness skill development. Effortful control
is reduced through continued practice. Through practice, awareness
itself becomes the object of attention in meta-awareness as the
meta-function is acquired as a skill. Clarity, as a form of
phenomenal intensity during practice increases as does equanimity,
which refers to impartiality reducing later attentional and emotional
stages of strategic processing that could potentially involve
prolonged sympathetic arousal, cognitive elaboration, or ruminative
qualities.
or behavioral schemas that are unrelated to the focal goal in work-
ing memory, and facilitation of attentional disengagement from
distractor stimuli.
AN INTEGRATIVE FRONTO-PARIETAL CONTROL NETWORK FOR S-ART
Exploration of the current literature suggests that an integra-
tive network supported by mindfulness may improve efficiency
and guide changes in self-specific, affect-biased attention by inte-
grating information from the three self-specific networks. The
fronto-parietal control system (FPCS) [rostral frontopolar PFC
(FPC), right VLPFC, DMPFC, dorsal ACC, DLPFC, AIC, lat-
eral cerebellum, and anterior inferior parietal lobe (aIPL)] is
uniquely situated to integrate information coming from the other
three systems and facilitate global reorganization or plasticity
amongst the networks. The aIPL and DLPFC have been impli-
cated in working memory, and are thought to contribute to
regulating attention within this network. As described earlier,
VLPFC shares conscious and non-conscious roles in recollect-
ing mnemonic associations and whether there is conflict in the
actions/choices being made in reference to the present context
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). The VLPFC has also shown to be
active during such effortful and controlled processing includ-
ing inhibition of set-switching, and inhibitory control (e.g., as
in go-nogo tasks) (Posner and Petersen, 1990). The FPC has
also been implicated in top-down monitoring and described by
some as the “supervisory attentional gateway” (SAG) controlling
stimulus-independent and stimulus-oriented cognition (Burgess
et al., 2007). Furthermore, FPC has been associated with coor-
dinating information processing between multiple brain regions
(see Vincent et al., 2008). It is these substrates that support intro-
spective meta-monitoring and the relational binding necessary
for self-awareness and self-regulation.
The FPCS has some functional overlap with the EPS network
(including DLPFC, DMPFC, AIC), suggesting present-centered
awareness is critical for self-regulation and targeting attentional
bias. The FPCS has been emphasized by Vincent et al. (2008)
and others (Seeley et al., 2007; Liao et al., 2010; Deshpande
et al., 2011) to integrate task positive and task negative net-
works through executive control and salience processing. There
is now some research to suggest that inadequate integration
between the self-specifying networks and the NS network may be
a significant contributor to emotion dysregulation (Bressler and
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Menon, 2010), and affective biased attention (Todd et al., 2012).
For example, Bressler and Menon (2010) suggest that salience
processing by AIC and dorsal ACC play a causal role in switch-
ing between task positive and task negative networks (Bressler
and Menon, 2010). Todd et al. (2012) proposes that affective
biased attention operates before conscious cognitive reappraisal
or suppression strategies, suggesting poor feedback from the EES
network and subsequent prioritization of overlearned habitual
responses. It may be the case that the development of meta-
awareness facilitates the role of FPCS in integration and increased
efficiency of the networks for S-ART. Thus, through mindfulness
training, cognitive and emotional resources are proposed to be
utilized more effectively and in an adaptive fashion.
The three most widely cited brain areas of activity and gross
morphological change during and in response to both FA and
OM meditation training has been the DLPFC, the ACC, and the
insula [see Lutz et al. (2007); Chiesa and Serretti (2010); Rubia
(2009); Holzel et al. (2011a) for review], suggesting FPCN and
EPS-related processing is heavily influenced through training.
Across nine different MBI studies (Lazar et al., 2005; Pagnoni
and Cekic, 2007; Holzel et al., 2008, 2010, 2011b; Luders et al.,
2009; Vestergaard-Poulsen et al., 2009; Grant et al., 2010a; Manna
et al., 2010), differences in GM volume and density (in compar-
ison to non-meditating controls) have been found using MRI in
the dorsal and rostral ACC, suggesting a prominent role for the
FPCN. Tang et al. (2007, 2009, 2010) show that as little as five
days (20min/day) of Integrated Body Mind Training (IBMT),
involving components of FA and OM produces greater activa-
tion in the rACC during rest. From as little as 11 h (over 1
month) of IBMT, increases in structural connectivity were found
indicated by increased fractional anisotropy, an MRI diffusion
tensor imaging index indicating the integrity and efficiency of
white matter connecting ACC to other cortical and subcorti-
cal structures. One study investigating acute pain in experienced
meditators found that mPFC/rACC activation was negatively cor-
related with pain unpleasantness ratings in a non-meditative state
(Brown and Jones, 2010). In the control group, the opposite cor-
relation was found with overall lower activity, suggesting less
attentional control during experience of acute pain. Two studies
of samatha-vipassana practitioners (5000 to >10,000 h practice)
demonstrated increased BOLD activation (compared with non-
meditators and within the meditation group) in rostral ACC
and DMPFC during FA meditation (Holzel et al., 2007; Manna
et al., 2010). Manna et al. (2010) also found meditation-specific
increases in precuneus, bilateral IFG, and right parahippocam-
pal gyrus during OM > Rest condition. Interestingly, the same
study found that during the FA meditation, the right IFG and
left PIC positively correlated with meditation expertise (num-
ber of hours of practice) (Manna et al., 2010). Given the overlap
across networks, these data further support a role for the FPCN
in improving network interactions in advanced meditators. Many
of these activations show dominance in the left hemisphere (in
comparison to rest), which may reflect increased positive disposi-
tions (Davidson and Irwin, 1999) and increased meta-awareness
(Tagini and Raffone, 2010). Furthermore, advanced meditators
show resistance to age-related decline in FPCN and self-specifying
brain areas. For example, one study of Vipassana practitioners
(>2500 h of practice) found increased cortical thickness in AIC,
DLPFC, anterior PFC, and sensory cortices (Lazar et al., 2005).
Normal age-related decline in GM volume and in attentional
performance was present in controls but not in meditators, sug-
gesting that meditation slows the natural progression of cortical
thinning over time.
MINDFULNESS-BASED MENTAL TRAINING: METHODS FOR
ADAPTIVE SELF-FUNCTIONING AND INTEGRATING
SELF-SPECIFIC NETWORKS SUPPORTING S-ART
There is now evidence to suggest that mindfulness practice can
modulate and produce enduring neuroplastic changes, including
gross morphological changes, across the self-specific networks,
and an integrative FPCN supporting S-ART. The extant data sup-
port a strong emphasis on activity of the self-specifying networks
and decreased NS activity during baseline and goal-directed
activity after mindfulness training. Additionally, increased activ-
ity is commonly found in the EPS network and FPCN during
meditation practice. Yet, multivariate network types of analyses
have not demonstrated conclusively how all the networks inter-
act in the context of meditation training and practice, during
basal states of inactivity, and during goal-directed tasks. Given
the role of the FPCN in executive control and in integrating
information between task positive and task negative networks,
mindfulness may effectively facilitate context-appropriate switch-
ing between anticorrelated networks, rather than simply increase
the functional activity of experiental self-processing or suppres-
sion of NS. The evidence suggests state-dependent activation
and integration of task positive and task negative networks sup-
port reduction of self-specific biases and may contribute to a
sustainable healthy mind; however, such hypotheses need to be
further tested. Here we explicitly describe how three types of
mindfulness-based meditation practices function by illustrating
the putative neurocognitive mechanisms in conceptual process
models (see Figures 3–5) and how each component mechanism
may map onto the self-specific networks identified above to
support S-ART.
FOCUSED ATTENTION (FA) CONCENTRATION PRACTICE
FA practice involves sustained attention on a specific mental
or sensory object: a repeated sound or mantra, an imagined
or physical image, or specific viscerosomatic sensations. The
object of focus can be anything, but the method described by the
Satipattha¯na Sutta identifies a naturally occurring breath focus. In
fact, breath is a particularly apt foundation because it integrates
conscious awareness with ongoing, dynamic viscerosomatic
function. The goal of FA practice is to stabilize the mind from dis-
traction, torpor, and hyperexcitability, all of which are predicted
to be negatively correlated with practice. Effort is hypothesized to
be inversely correlated with practice duration, providing a neu-
robiological mechanism for advancement of the practitioner and
resulting in decreased allocation of explicit cognitive resources
over time. A process model for FA is illustrated in Figure 3.
FA practice is described here to involve an underlying frame-
work of motor learning that functions to strengthen non-
conscious, associative memory processes underlying the EES
network (and subcortical analogs), and which support the
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conscious, explicit processes recruited during practice. Intention,
a critical component of mindfulness in previous conceptual mod-
els (see Shapiro et al., 2006), is described to be critical for moti-
vating the practitioner to begin/sustain practice and activating
EES networks that may be the initial steps for extinguishing mal-
adaptive habitual perceptual-motor action tendencies. Intention
and motivation may also target attentional tuning and affective
control settings which contribute to affect-biased attention (Todd
et al., 2012). The instructions for practice form an executive “set”
that is created and sustained by working memory processes, while
attentional processes operate to focus and sustain concentration
on the intended object. Alerting, orienting, engagement, and dis-
engagement all involve discrete networks (Posner and Petersen,
1990) which complement one another in their contributions to
the FA practice. An executive monitoring function is proposed
to provide feedback when the goal state of concentration on the
particular object has shifted and to support the attentional pro-
cesses related to the return of focus. Meta-awareness is described
to arise as a highly developed form of executive monitor that
allows the practitioner to have awareness as the object of attention
while simultaneously maintaining awareness in its natural state,
whichever object of attention it may be resting upon. Sensory
clarity is presumed to increase in proportion to the strength-
ening of meta-awareness. Given the perspective shift one must
learn through development of meta-awareness, decentering is
described as a psychological process that may be a mechanism to
support disengagement processes and sensory clarity.
Equanimity and clarity are both processes that support con-
centrative practice and are proposed to increase in terms of
efficiency and phenomenal quality through time and prac-
tice. Similar to the Buddhist description (see Section “Defining
Meditation and Mindfulness from the Historical Perspective”),
equanimity refers to response inhibition and emotion regulation
processes that reduce later attentional and emotional stages of
strategic processing potentially involving prolonged sympathetic
arousal, cognitive elaboration, or ruminative qualities which may
arise in response to an object of distraction. Increased clarity of
experience is proposed to operate as one develops an increased
phenomenal awareness of the breath and objects of distraction
arise and disappear, without necessarily affecting the cognitive
access of the contents of conscious experience.
OPEN MONITORING (OM) RECEPTIVE PRACTICE
Figure 4 illustrates a process model for the receptive practice,
OM, which is described in detail elsewhere. Novices begin by
actively monitoring and labeling external (exteroceptive) or inter-
nal (interoceptive) domains of the five senses, including viscero-
somatic states and inner speech. The specific sensory modal-
ities provide the scaffolding for meta-awareness to develop in
each domain and in relation to self-related processing. There is
an explicit distinction between engagement and disengagement
with an object early on in the practice. Provided the frame-
work of motor learning, advancement of the practitioner is likely
to automatize aspects of attentional processing and improve
efficiency of engagement and disengagement processes, thereby
reducing bias associated with orienting of attention. For exam-
ple, when distraction arises, and the practitioner gets “stuck”
in thought or emotion, a number of mechanisms supported by
mindfulness-based practices may facilitate disengagement. The
practitioner is encouraged to continually rest in awareness of
intero- and exteroceptive stimuli, and any cognitive or emotional
states that may arise. Through training, the practitioner can learn
to note and sustain attention on the arising, passing, or absence of
each modality of experience—naturally reducing the frequency of
cognitive evaluation or rumination. Eventually, through training,
the process of mental noting becomes effortless and non-reactive,
qualities that describe the development of equanimity. At this
point, efficiency of the attentional system has improved, resulting
in decreased allotment of attentional resources toward any par-
ticular feeling, image, or thought. Cognitive emotion regulation
strategies like reappraisal or suppression may be more preva-
lent in novice practitioners dealing with distraction, but less so
in advanced practitioners as attentional systems are strengthened
and qualities of equanimity arise. One may hypothesize that the
changes from novice to advanced practitioner may be due to
the development of psychological processes like non-attachment,
de-centering, or from a non-conscious shift in affect-biased atten-
tion and the development of meta-awareness. Whichever the
mechanism, maladaptive scripts and schemas related to the self
are proposed to be extinguished and reconsolidated through a
combination of FA and OM practice.
Similar meditation practices instruct the practitioner to main-
tain a diffuse form of attention or ambient attentional focus such
as “Shikantaza” or “just sitting” in Japanese Soto Zen (Austin,
2006); “choiceless awareness” by Krishnamurti (1969), insight
meditation from Theravada (Pali: Vipassana) (Lutz et al., 2007),
and “absolute rest,” by other western Buddhist teachers (Young,
2010). Vipassana, has also been translated as “removing the veil
of ignorance” (Gunaratana, 2002), such that this stage of med-
itation practice explicitly aims at providing insight into one’s
self-related processes. In advanced practices, the practitioner can
reside in a non-dual level of awareness, referred to by the Buddhist
Abhidharma scholars as a clear understanding of no distinc-
tion between knowing subject and perceived or known object
(Dunne, 2011). Some Buddhist traditions have referred to this
non-dual practice as “Open Presence” (Thangru and Johnson,
2004; Lutz et al., 2007), “open awareness,” “rig.pa” in Tibetan
forms of Dzogchen (Rinpoche et al., 2006), or “phyag.chen”
in Mahamudra (Thangru and Johnson, 2004). Non-dual prac-
tice involves the decreased reliance on engagement and disen-
gagement processes, mental noting or labeling techniques. Such
changes in the practice are likely to affect the relationship the
practitioner has with his/her own thoughts, so that cognitive
structures related to ones’ thought and emotion that represent
reality are “de-fused” from what is considered reality itself (Hayes
et al., 2003; Dunne, 2011).
ETHICAL ENHANCEMENT (EE) PRACTICES
The diminishing of grasping, aversion, and delusion that arises
in insight meditation practice naturally leads the practitioner
to greater loving-kindness toward oneself and others (Salzberg,
2011). The cultivation of loving-kindness (Pali; metta), or for-
giveness can also have very explicit instructions for visualization
and is based on the premise that all beings want to be happy.
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FIGURE 4 | Mindfulness process model—open monitoring receptive
practice. OM meditation with no object of focus (ambient attention) is
illustrated as an example, but the processes are proposed to be the same
across receptive styles of practice. Intention is formed along with motivation
to practice before an executive “set” is created. The working memory system
helps to maintain motivation and practice instructions. Ambient (diffuse)
attentional networks are recruited and sustained along with support by
component mechanisms including executive monitoring, emotion regulation,
and response inhibition. Mental noting and labeling of stimuli arising, passing,
and absent in phenomenal conscious awareness is a form of emotion
regulation and contributes to extinction and reconsolidation of maladaptive
procedural and declarative memories that represent sensory-affective-motor
scripts and schemas. Affective responses may arise in response to an object of
attention with a positive, negative, or neutral valence and are likely to proliferate
unless awareness and de-centering promote response inhibition and
disengagement. Over time and continued practice, effortful control is reduced
and awareness itself becomes the object of attention as meta-awareness is
cultivated as a skill. Clarity and Equanimity increases through practice.
The following excerpt comes from one of the original teachings
of loving-kindness practice.
Even as a mother protects with her life
Her child, her only child,
So with a boundless heart
Should one cherish all living beings
(Karaniya metta sutta, 1.8)
Contemporary instruction for the cultivation of loving-
kindness can be found in the works of Sharon Salzberg (Salzberg
and Bush, 1999) and by Matthieu Ricard (Ricard, 2003), but
such practices are based on the method found in Buddhaghosa’s
5th century text, the Path to Purification (Buddhaghosa, 1991).
This traditional approach is characterized by progressive cultiva-
tion of loving-kindness toward oneself, a good friend, a neutral
person, a difficult person, all four of the above equally, and
then gradually the entire universe. The loving-kindness is culti-
vated in reference to a specific declarative (episodic) memory of
each particular individual or event. The practitioner is encour-
aged to avoid choosing someone to whom they are sexually
attracted or who is dead (Ricard, 2003). For a “neutral” person,
the practitioner is encouraged to choose someone they may come
into contact with every day, but who does not give rise to strong
positive nor strong negative emotions. For a “difficult” person,
the practitioner is encouraged to choose an enemy, or someone
strongly disliked. Furthermore, the practitioner is encouraged
to break down the barriers between self and other by practic-
ing loving-kindness repeatedly, achieving impartiality toward the
four persons, including him/herself, the close friend, the neutral
person, and the hostile person. The EE practice is illustrated in
Figure 5.
Compassion practice has also been described as an EE style of
practice; however, without the simultaneous cultivation of open
presence along with the generation of compassion, the practice
has been described to be unsuccessful (see Lutz et al., 2007).
Compassion practice is also described as an enactive, emergent
process of factors in the attentional and affective domains, the
intentional and insight domains, and the embodied and engaged
domains of subjective experience (Halifax, 2012). Similar to the
metta practice described above is Tonglen, a Tibetan Buddhist
term for the meditation technique translated as “giving and
taking” or “sending and receiving” in which the practitioner visu-
alizes taking onto oneself the suffering of others on the in-breath,
and on the out-breath giving happiness, joy, and kindness (Lama
Xiv et al., 2001; Lutz et al., 2007).
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FIGURE 5 | Mindfulness process model. Ethical-enhancement (EE)
practice. Intention is formed along with motivation to practice before an
executive “set” is created within the working memory system in order to
implement and maintain practice instructions. Focused attentional networks
are recruited for orienting toward sustained episodic memory recall
involving mentalizing and shared experience. OM practice is described to
supplement EE practice facilitating awareness of any modality of
experience that arises. The processes are proposed to be the same across
ethical styles of practice that require imagined suffering or a particular
declarative memory [of someone or something]. Mentalizing one’s own or
others’ suffering continues recurrently as part of sustained episodic
memory recall. With clarity and equanimity for affective reactivity, OM
practice allows the practitioner to remain mindfully aware of difficult
emotions while the declarative (episodic) memory is positively reappraised.
Negative associations are extinguished and reconsolidated into more
adaptive or positive memories using prosocial/empathic concern for the
object of meditation. Continuous reappraisal along with prosocial concern
is thought to enhance exposure, extinction, and reconsolidation processes
such that new episodic memories are laid down and inhibit older
maladaptive forms of the memory.
SIX COMPONENT NEUROCOGNITIVE MECHANISMS OF
MINDFULNESS
As illustrated, mindfulness is not a unitary construct and the
process models are an attempt to illustrate the cognitive and
psychological processes that support the meditation practices.
These component processes provide the proposedmechanisms by
which mindfulness works to increase S-ART—the framework for
reducing self-specific biases and sustaining a healthy mind. The S-
ART framework includes six component supportive mechanisms
underlying the practice and cultivation of mindfulness as a state
and trait: (1) intention and motivation; (2) attention regulation;
(3) emotion regulation; (4) memory extinction and reconsoli-
dation; (5) prosociality; (6) non-attachment and de-centering.
Here we describe the neurobiological substrates of each mecha-
nism and provide support from the extant contemplative science
literature.
INTENTION AND MOTIVATION
As originally proposed by Shapiro and colleagues (2006),
intention is one of the fundamental building blocks out of which
an array of neurocognitive mechanisms may emerge to effec-
tively cultivate mindfulness. Intention and motivation are based
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on inter-related aspects of affective style and biological disposi-
tion, driving goal-directed behavior (Davidson and Irwin, 1999;
Ryan and Deci, 2000). External and internal motivation have
been distinguished as two unique classes of motivation. Although
both classes refer to incentives of reward, external motivation
arises from the desire to approach (avoid) an externally imposed
reward (punishment); while internal motivation arises from a
more automatic, internally driven desire to obtain reward, or sat-
isfy one’s needs (Davidson et al., 2000; Ochsner and Gross, 2005;
Rothman et al., 2011). People are clearly motivated to practice
by very unique factors with highly varied experiences, incentives,
and consequences; however, through advancement of practice,
motivation is proposed here to become more internally driven
(i.e., suggesting increased control) and less focused on outcome.
Intention refers more specifically to a purposive plan of action
that is selected and the timing selected for such action (Krieghoff
et al., 2011).
Motivation and intention are described as a feedback sys-
tem for self-schema maintenance. As in any feedback system,
sensory input is continually compared to a reference, and dis-
crepancy from the reference feeds back into frontal goal-oriented
networks and eventually to pre-motor-action networks modu-
lating functional output. If the reference is some ideal that is
unrealistic or if the interpretation of incoming signals related
to the self are continually negative in valence, then there is an
error signal of which the rate of discrepancy reduction may never
progress, perpetuating negative affect (Carver and Scheier, 2011).
Negatively biased cognitions and/or distorted perceptions that
involve disinterest, disapproval, or rejection have been shown
to result in nonsocial, isolating behaviors (including avoidance
and withdrawal), impaired self-regulation, and psychopathology;
conversely, current data suggest that approach behavior including
more engaging perceptions involving interest, approval, or accep-
tance typically lead to healthier outcomes (Waikar and Craske,
1997; Sin and Lyubomirsky, 2009). Thus, internally driven moti-
vation to engage with experience without craving or aversion (i.e.,
with equanimity) is suggested to increase self-regulation.
Davidson and Irwin (1999) suggest there are two fundamen-
tal resting patterns of neural activity for motivational systems of
approach and avoidance. Left anterior PFC activation has been
associated with positive affect and increased right-sided ante-
rior activation with negative affect, suggesting that individual
differences in asymmetric activation of these brain regions can
be associated with dispositional differences in a biological set
point for motivation and which may contribute to the overall
outcomes of mindfulness training. Davidson and Irwin (1999)
further delineates functional differences between ventromedial
and dorsolateral sectors of PFC, suggesting that activation of the
former represent immediate valenced goal states along with acti-
vation of the ventral striatopallidum [incl. nucleus accumbens
(nAcc)], while the latter area DLPFC represent valenced goal
states in the absence of immediately present incentives. In other
words, DLPFC may contribute to a sustained form of motivation
that remains in working memory during the meditation practice.
Furthermore, animal and human research suggest that activity in
the PFC canmodulate the ventral striatopallidum and specifically
nAcc activity in a top-downmanner, postulating a mechanism for
tracking internally driven, approach forms of motivation (Heller
et al., 2009) as well as regulating aspects of craving associated
with more phasic nAcc activity (Robbins and Everitt, 1996). More
recent data suggests that decreased ventrolateral PFC (VLPFC)
activity may also be evidence for increased approach behavior and
expression of positive affect (Light et al., 2011). The contribu-
tions of these substrates to habits and automatization are typically
described to be hard-wired, but through FA/OM and ethical
based practices, it is proposed that extinction and reconsolida-
tion mechanisms (see Section “Extinction and reconsolidation”)
can shift biological set-points andmodify pathological scripts and
schemas into more adaptive trajectories.
There has yet to be extensive investigation of motivation,
intention, and reward in meditation and mindfulness research;
however there is some PET data demonstrating increased endoge-
nous dopamine release in the ventral striatum during Yoga
Nidra meditation (Kjaer et al., 2002), a finding accompanied
by a reported “decrease desire for action.” Expression of loving-
kindness, a sense of connectedness, and feelings of trust and coop-
eration have all shown to produce increased activity in the ventral
striatum (Cialdini et al., 1997; Bora et al., 2009). Significant
increased activations in rostral ACC and OFC have been found
in the majority of non-guided meditation studies, suggesting
effects related to attentional focus, but also likely related to tonic
intentional activity.
ATTENTION REGULATION
Volitional shifting of conscious awareness between objects of
attention in a serial and/or parallel fashion is suggested to
be a critical process for effectively managing or altering one’s
responses and impulses. This executive, volitional management of
attention can explicitly control where and when attention shifts
in top-down fashion. Regulation is also believed to occur from
a bottom-up direction, such that cognitive resources are con-
served and non-conscious afferent-efferent systems interact with
the environment in an efficient, adaptive feedback loop with top-
down systems. Concentration forms of practice are proposed to
increase the efficiency of the attentional system, including the
dissociable, but interrelated sub-components of attentional pro-
cessing. The subcomponents are identified in the concentrative
practice process model (Figure 3) and include alerting and ori-
enting toward an intended object of interest, engaging with the
object, sustaining attentional focus, executive monitoring and
detecting distraction, disengaging from the source of distraction,
and re-engaging on the intended object (Posner and Petersen,
1990; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Raz and Buhle, 2006; Posner
and Rothbart, 2009).
Efficiency and stability are also measured by sustained atten-
tion (i.e., vigilance and alertness), referring to the capacity to
detect unpredictable stimuli over prolonged periods of time
(Posner and Rothbart, 1998). Deep engagement, vivid absorp-
tion, or concentration power, is an embodied state of awareness
in which no other sensory or internally generated input can arise
beyond a perceptual threshold (Rahula, 1974; Bodhi, 1999). Full
absorption in an object with focal awareness is critical for stabiliz-
ing the mind during FA meditation; however, it can be maladap-
tive, such that inhibitory processes can prevent pertinent sensory
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information from arising to conscious awareness, decreasing
available cognitive resources for ongoing task demands, and
potentially leading to an overwhelming sensation and mainte-
nance of emotional reactivity related to the object of focus (Mogg
and Bradley, 1998). Regulatory efficiency and stability are also
measured under various conditions of perceptual load or con-
flicting contexts (e.g., Stroop phenomena), through continued
performance with fewer distractions, through the rapid disen-
gagement from an object of focus to another intended object
in rapid succession (e.g., attentional blink paradigm, dotprobe
task), and through an ability to shift back and forth between
local and global features (e.g., perceptual rivalry task). The neural
substrates for these attentional processes are described through
S-ART networks. For example, preparatory forms of attention are
described through EES circuitry, while the substrates for FA and
executive monitoring are described through EPS and the FPCS. It
is likely that distinct circuitry may also be identified for arising,
passing, and restful states of concentration for each modality of
focus.
Although people generally claim to have full conscious aware-
ness of their environment when their focal attention is directed
outward or toward their own internal thoughts, attention research
shows that this is quite false. In fact, it is very likely that par-
ticular information from the environment is filtered out unless
reaching some perceptual or semantically meaningful threshold
before it can gain access to conscious awareness. At a very basic
perceptual level, our focal awareness is very small relative to
the rest of the context around that focus, such that we experi-
ence a phenomenon called “change blindness” when cues such
as motion, that normally lead to a shift of attention, are sup-
pressed and major changes across sensory or semantic modalities
in the remainder of the environment are not reported (Simons
and Levin, 1997; Posner and Rothbart, 2009). There is ample
evidence that early stages of attentional processing and fleeting
perceptual traces of sensory information exist before there is con-
scious awareness (Pessoa, 2005). Receptive forms of meditation
(i.e., OM) facilitate more diffuse or ambient attentional mech-
anisms and consequently, phenomenological awareness of the
objects in conscious experience is likely enhanced, without nec-
essarily increasing cognitive access [see (Davis and Thompson,
forthcoming)]. Thus, reportability for states of interoception
and exteroception may not necessarily be improved, while more
subtle, non-conscious processes supported through EES may
improve in efficiency. These forms of early, non-conscious pro-
cessing can be measured in pre-categorical, high capacity sensory
memory stores (Sperling, 1960; Chrousos and Gold, 1992), per-
ceptual rivalry, or affect-biased attention (Attar et al., 2010; Todd
et al., 2012). Future research in the contemplative sciences will
likely reveal more subtle changes in non-conscious states of early
stages of perceptual and attentional processing. A recent pilot
study used an iconic memory task, in which an array of eight
letters was displayed for 30ms and a target letter was to be iden-
tified up to 1000ms after the trace was removed. The study
found dispositional mindfulness, non-attachment, and compas-
sion in advanced meditators was not associated with accuracy,
but positively correlated with the subjects’ ability to identify
a letter adjacent to the correct target and in the larger array.
It is proposed, therefore, that such dispotional factors leads to
increased diffuse attention to the periphery without improving
iconic perceptual memory traces to the target focus of an 8-item
array (Fischer et al., 2012).
Meta-awareness points to the possibility of taking awareness
itself as an object of attention and can be disambiguated from
sensory-conceptual domains of self-experience especially evident
in the NS (Lutz et al., 2007). Meta-awareness contributes the
critical mnemonic aspect of mindful awareness responsible for
monitoring the meditative state so that one may “see and know”
when they have lost the focus of attention on the object, or
emotion has become reactive or ruminative. Likewise, the same
meta-awareness serves to determine whether there is dullness
or too much excitation during the practice and therefore, con-
tributes to the phenomenal intensity or clarity in which the
meditation is experienced (Lutz et al., 2007). Without such a
highly developed sense of self-awareness, the contents of sub-
jective experience are continually entangled with the patterns
of conditioned and consolidated schemas that dictate behavior.
Husserl refers to this abstracting from all objects as “epoche,” or
bracketing objects of conscious experience in order to reflect on
the contents within it (Varela et al., 1991). Meta-awareness may
differ from the EPS only in its relation to the world, from which
one is able to study the intentional contents of the mind in a
transcendent, non-conceptual way.
Recent studies have investigated the role of short- and
long-term mindfulness-based meditation practice on the sub-
components of the attentional system (alerting, orienting,
engagement, and disengagement), and at the early perceptual and
non-conscious stages of processing external stimuli that could
reflect changes in attentional bias (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007;
Chan and Woollacott, 2007; Slagter et al., 2007; Tang et al., 2007;
Cahn and Polich, 2009; Hodgins and Adair, 2010; van den Hurk
et al., 2010b; Ganaden and Smith, 2011; Vago and Nakamura,
2011). One study that utilized the Attention Network Test (ANT)
found significantly better executive monitoring at baseline in
a group of experienced meditators (4-week intensive retreat)
than control subjects (Jha et al., 2007). After MBSR, individu-
als demonstrated improved endogenous orienting ability, while
the 4-week retreat group showed improved exogenous alerting-
related processes, reflecting the advanced training in receptive
forms of practice (Jha et al., 2007; Ganaden and Smith, 2011).
van den Hurk et al. (2010a,b) used the same ANT task with
long-term (∼15 years. practice) meditators and found improved
orienting and executive monitoring ability in comparison to age-
matched controls (van denHurk et al., 2010a). Five days of IBMT,
a receptive practice also demonstrated improvements in executive
attention using the ANT task (Tang et al., 2007). Several recent
studies have also reported improvements in sustained attention
during the performance of other exogenous cueing tasks, or con-
tinued performance tasks. One longitudinal study (3 months,
5 h/day) found that retreatants showed enhanced perceptual dis-
crimination and vigilance, an observation that remained constant
3 months after the retreat ended (MacLean et al., 2010). These
results suggest a form of plasticity in attention-related networks
that can manifest between 5 days and 3 months of intensive
mental training.
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Alerting attention toward a stimulus can operate at very early
levels of perceptual processing (<300ms) and is sometimes con-
sidered an automatic process, taking the form of attentional bias
toward, or away from, an object (Mogg et al., 1995). A few hun-
dred milliseconds before an eye movement, visual attention is
directed toward the forthcoming target locations, shifting acti-
vations in saccade and attention areas of the brain and enabling
planning of actions toward those locations (Deubel, 2008). In a
sample of female fibromyalgia patients, a preliminary study of
mindfulness meditation on attentional bias revealed decreased
avoidance at early stages of attention toward pain-related cues in
those patients exposed to 8-weeks of mindfulness training (Vago
and Nakamura, 2011). Other studies have also showed the influ-
ence of meditation practice on early phases of non-conscious
attention (Srinivasan and Baijal, 2007; Cahn and Polich, 2009)
and bias (Garland et al., 2010; Paul et al., 2012). For example,
Srinivasan and Baijal (2007) demonstrated increased mismatch
negativity (MMN) amplitudes in concentrative meditation (Sahaj
Samadhi) practitioners immediately before and after practice,
and in contrast to novice practitioners. These studies suggest
enhanced perceptual sensitivity even before conscious forms of
attention are allocated.
As attentional effort decreases over time and practice (see
Figures 3 and 4), the efficiency of attentional networks improves
and more cognitive resources are made available. Increased
efficiency (decreased effort) of attentional networks has been
demonstrated elegantly in reduced resource allocation in one
study of subjects who underwent three months of intensive mind-
fulness meditation training and were tested using an attentional-
blink paradigm (Slagter et al., 2007). Attentional blink refers
to a deficit in perception of a second target (T2) when pre-
sented in rapid succession (<500ms) following an initial target
(T1) embedded in a stream of stimuli presented in close tem-
poral proximity (Slagter et al., 2007). This deficit is believed to
result from competition between the two targets for limited atten-
tional resources. A smaller attentional blink and reduced brain-
resource allocation to T1 was reflected by a smaller T1-elicited
P3b, a brain-potential index of resource allocation (Slagter
et al., 2007). Interestingly, those individuals that showed the
largest decrease in T1-elicited P3b amplitude generally showed
the greatest reduction in attentional-blink size. Another study
demonstrated that expert meditators with least hours of expe-
rience (10,000–24,000 h) showed increased activity (compared
to novices) in the left DLPFC during FA practice (vs. rest),
while expert meditators with the most hours of practice (37,000–
52,000 h) showed decreased activity in left DLPFC than both
groups. Other studies have specifically found improvement in
efficiency, reduced interference and increased control. Manna
and colleagues (2010) found that right DLPFC deactivation
was positively correlated with expertise, suggesting decreased
effort in advanced practitioners during FA meditation. Relative
meditation experience (ranging from 82 to 19,200 h) has been
positively correlated with reduced interference on the Stroop
task (Chan and Woollacott, 2007), although Stroop interference
was not found in a group of meditators trained in an eight-
week MBSR course (Anderson et al., 2007). These data suggest
that as meditation practice becomes increasingly effortless in
advanced practitioners, more efficient allocation of resources is
observed.
EMOTION REGULATION
There is growing evidence that mindfulness training improves
emotion or self-regulation skills as evident from a variety of self-
report, physiological, and neuroimaging methods (Baer et al.,
2009; Carmody, 2009). One explanatory mechanism underlying
alterations in health, brain structure and function may rest on the
fact that mindfulness-based meditation practices strengthen neu-
ral systems important for emotion regulation, specifically eval-
uative, expressive, and experiential aspects of emotion. Emotion
regulation is therefore also very similar, if not partially redundant
with the concept of self-regulation, referring to the ability to shift
focus of attention at will, and modulate ongoing emotional activ-
ity (e.g., decrease elaborative processing of thoughts/feelings)
(Gross, 1998; Northoff, 2005; Carver and Scheier, 2011; Koole
et al., 2011). In this context, emotion is measured through multi-
ple components including cognitive, viscerosomatic, behavioral,
and physiological responses.
In several publications, Davidson (2000, 2004) has referred to
emotion regulation in terms of affective style and has described
opportunity for regulation at various dynamics of affective
chronometry: (1) the threshold to respond; (2) the magni-
tude of the response; (3) the rise time to the peak of the
response; (4) the recovery function of the response; and (5)
the duration of the response. For example, one can consider
the recovery function of the response to be rapid (steep) and
time to the next response as a refractory phase that may be
reduced in practitioners of mindfulness-based meditative tech-
niques. Regulation has been described in the literature through
automatic and controlled strategies (Parkinson and Totterdell,
1999; McRae et al., 2011). Automatic regulation refers to the
modulation of affect-related variables at a non-conscious level.
For example, homeostatic mediators associated with the stress
response and involved in generating affect can be non-consciously
regulated through training. Controlled regulation can include
antecedent-focused or response-focused strategies that require
some behavioral or cognitive process. Antecedent-focused strate-
gies focus on controlling the selection or modification of the
context to avoid the emotion altogether or to modify the emo-
tional impact (e.g., by performing a secondary distracting task,
or cognitive reappraisal) (McRae et al., 2011). Response-focused
strategies only affect the output of appraisal process and either
augment or suppress behavioral manifestations of one’s emo-
tional state, such as smiling, frowning, or experiential avoid-
ance (Gross, 1998; Koole et al., 2011). Many of these controlled
strategies may be used in novices when emotional reactivity
arises as a form of distraction; however, cognitive strategies
are less likely in more advanced practitioners. Non-cognitive
strategies are typically encouraged in dealing with the arising
and passing of emotions during practice, even when the emo-
tions are particularly intense or stressful. For example, mental
noting and labeling the modalities of the emotional experi-
ence becomes the first line of defense, a technique shown to
reduce amygdala activity and emotional expression (Lieberman
et al., 2007). This is more likely an expression of equanimity
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that naturally arises through continued development of meta-
awareness.
The S-ART framework supports the notion that mindfulness-
based practice can strengthen controlled emotion regulation pro-
cesses early on in novice practitioners. Most research in the area
of emotion regulation includes a focus on various subdivisions
of the PFC that have most consistently been implicated in emo-
tion and cognitive control processes, including decision-making,
appraisal, and impulse control. These areas include the OFC,
DMPFC, ACC, DLPFC, and VLPFC (Davidson and Irwin, 1999;
Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Phillips et al., 2008). Across a num-
ber of different MBI studies (Lazar et al., 2005; Holzel et al.,
2008; Luders et al., 2009; Grant et al., 2010a; Holzel et al., 2010),
differences in GM volume and density (in comparison to non-
meditating controls) have been found using MRI in OFC and
lateral PFC. Increased activity in prefrontal areas has also been
found in experienced meditators (compared to non-meditators)
during meditative states (Jevning et al., 1996; Lazar et al., 2000;
Holzel et al., 2007, 2011b; Newberg et al., 2010), in some cases
specifically in lateral PFC (Baron Short et al., 2010; Farb et al.,
2007; Raffone and Srinivasan, 2010). There is some evidence to
suggest that abnormal GM concentration and/or functional activ-
ity in the left sgACC may be indicative of dysfunctional emotion
regulation ability and potential for developing depressive sympto-
mology (Drevets et al., 1997). Other areas found to be critical in
their respective interactions with the PFC are the amygdala, hip-
pocampus, striatum (including the nAcc), thalamus, and insula
(Davidson and Irwin, 1999; Phillips et al., 2008). The uncinate
fasciulus (UF) is a tract of fibers connecting limbic structures to
the PFC which is highly plastic over the course of development
and critical for emotion regulation and transformation. There
is growing evidence that dispositional mindfulness may act as a
marker for improved emotion regulation skills (Creswell et al.,
2007). For example, increased dispositional mindfulness (mea-
sured by theMAAS) has been correlated with increased activation
of VLPFC and attenuated activation in the amygdala (Lieberman
et al., 2007). Garland and colleagues (2009, 2011) propose that
positive reappraisal, a cognitive coping strategy, is a mechanism
by which mindfulness functions to regulate emotion and stress.
One study supports these claims by demonstrating dispositional
mindfulness (assessed by the KIMS) positively correlated with
bilateral activation of DMPFC during reappraisal of negative
pictures (Modinos et al., 2010). It remains unclear however, to
what extent reappraisal is used in mindfulness practice given
the emphasis on non-cognitive processing. Other studies have
demonstrated evidence for non-appraisal strategies associated
with mindfulness (Grant et al., 2010b; Gard et al., 2012). In sup-
port of more non-cognitive forms of emotion regulation, reduced
activity in executive, evaluative and emotion areas during acute
pain (PFC, amygdala, hippocampus) have been found in adept
practitioners of Zen, compared to controls (Grant et al., 2010b).
Meditators with themost experience showed the largest activation
reductions, suggesting a decreased need for effortful control in
advanced meditators. Importantly, the lower pain sensitivity and
higher thresholds for pain in meditators was strongly predicted
by reductions in functional connectivity between executive and
pain-related cortices. Results suggest a functional decoupling of
the cognitive-evaluative and sensory-discriminative dimensions
of pain, possibly allowing practitioners to view painful stimuli
more neutrally and with equanimity (Grant et al., 2010b). Grant
et al. (2010a,b) also demonstrated increased cortical thickness
in dACC that positively correlated with lower pain sensitivity in
the Zen meditators, suggesting an ability to monitor and express
emotions related to pain without a high negative valence (Grant
et al., 2010a).
The S-ART framework also supports the idea that
mindfulness-based practice can improve automatic forms
of regulation like homeostasis in the face of emotional or physical
stress by protecting the internal milieu from the harmful effects
of a stressor, which can be referred to as the “raincoat effect,” and
by facilitating recovery, which we refer to as the “towel effect.”
The raincoat acts as a metaphor for protection, as it protects one
from getting wet; the towel acts as a metaphor for recovery, as
it facilitates drying off when one already has gotten wet. These
metaphors have been used similarly to previous theoretical
models for psychoneuroimmunology (Ader et al., 1987; Feder
et al., 2009), and are used here to describe the expression of
equanimity that is tightly-coupled with the skills of mindful
awareness. Equanimity is supported by psychological processes
like decentering and non-attachment, de-coupling the sensory
and affective components of the stressor. As a result, sympathetic
tone is reduced and hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA)
axis-mediated mobilization is suppressed. A decreased stress
response to innocuous cues and rapid return to physiological
and emotional baseline in response to real threat should be
apparent across all physiological mediators such as the cate-
cholamines (e.g., epinephrine and norepinephrine) from the
adrenal medulla, glucocorticoids (e.g., cortisol) from the adrenal
cortex, pituitary hormones (e.g., ACTH, prolactin, and growth
hormones) and cytokines (e.g., IL-1, IL-6, and TNF-α) from
cells of the immune system. Mindfulness training is proposed to
reduce the chance for pathophysiological processes or unfavor-
able psychopathological outcomes by preventing perseverative
and chronic responses in the presence or imagined presence of
a stress-related physiological challenge and through effective
habituation to repeated stress-related challenges (McEwen,
2008). This form of self-regulation prevents “allostatic load,”
the cumulative wear and tear on the body and brain due to the
overactive or inefficiently managed stress response (McEwen,
1998; Sterling and Eyer, 1988). Long-term adverse effects are
avoided, including immunosuppresion, cardiovascular dysfunc-
tion and disease, accumulation of abdominal fat, loss of bone
minerals, reproductive impairments, decreased neurogenesis,
increased neuronal cell death and associated atrophy in the limbic
system (Jameison and Dinan, 2001; Sapolsky, 2003; McEwen,
2008).
The connections of the insular cortex with the thalamus, HPA
axis and brainstem are thought to provide a mechanism for vis-
cerosomatic and homeostatic feedback to the executive monitor
and regulation of sympathetic tone (Critchley, 2005; Craig, 2009).
In order to maintain homeostasis, the internal state of the body is
critical for the parasympathetic division of the autonomic ner-
vous system (ANS) to respond effectively to stressors. There are
two parasympathetic nerve centers in the brainstem medulla:
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dorsal and ventral. The vagal nuclei promote parasympathetic
tone, increased energy conservation through control of cardiovas-
cular and visceral function. The ventral vagal nuclei dampen the
sympathetic response specifically by targeting cardiorespiratory
organs; whereas, the dorsal nuclei target the gut and associated
viscera (Porges, 1995). The S-ART framework predicts mindful-
ness can facilitate both dorsal and ventral vagal tone through FA
on the body in the context of stressors.
There have been a number of studies reporting on the phys-
iological profile of meditators, which appears to be significantly
influenced by meditation practice, and may strongly contribute
to the neuroimmunological profile as well. For example, stud-
ies comparing experienced meditators to controls or short-term
meditators have demonstrated a particular physiological profile
across styles of practice suggestive of an alert, but hypometabolic
state in which there is decreased sympathetic nervous sys-
tem activity, and increased parasympathetic activity (Young and
Taylor, 1998; Benson, 2000; Cahn and Polich, 2006). Across med-
itation styles, electromyography has revealed muscle relaxation in
spite of the upright, unsupported posture (Austin, 2006). Skin
conductivity, along with oxygen consumption, heart rate, blood
pressure, cortisol, muscle tone, urinary vanillyl mandelic acid
(VMA) (a catecholamine metabolite), and rate of breathing all
decrease during meditation (Jevning et al., 1992; Benson, 2000;
Lazar et al., 2005; Austin, 2006). Critically, this hypometabolic
state has been shown to be qualitatively and quantitatively dif-
ferent from simple rest or sleep and more suggestive of a role in
prevention of stress-related hypertension or cardiovascular dis-
ease (Young and Taylor, 1998; Cahn and Polich, 2006). Other
more advanced meditation techniques focus specifically on alter-
ing control of breath (e.g., pranayama), and body-temperature
(e.g., Tummo), techniques which may be more highly speci-
fied toward impacting automatic regulatory processes. During
seated meditation, at a middle level of samatha, the breathing
rate may drop to only two or three breaths a minute (Lazar
et al., 2000; Austin, 2006), while normal adults at sea level breathe
about fifteen times per minute. The specific and non-specific
effects of mindfulness-based meditation on homeostatic regula-
tion are clearly an aspect of self-regulation that needs further
investigation.
Physiological studies have also supported the effects of medi-
tation on non-reactivity related to a rapid change back to baseline
after an emotional response. This rapid regulatory mechanism is
proposed to be an objective measure of equanimity. For exam-
ple, experienced transcendental meditators (>2 years experience)
showed more rapid decreases in skin conductance following aver-
sive stimuli (Goleman and Schwartz, 1976), while other studies
have shown decreased startle amplitude (Delgado et al., 2010;
Levenson et al., 2012), and other low-level bottom-up forms of
emotion regulation (van den Hurk et al., 2010b). Goldin and
Gross (2010) found that social anxiety patients show amore rapid
decrease in activation of the amygdala in response to negative
self-beliefs after a MBI (Goldin and Gross, 2010). Additionally,
Britton et al. (2012) demonstrated more rapid decreases in
self-reported state anxiety following a psychosocial stressor (in
comparison to pre-MBCT) (Britton et al., 2012). Other studies
investigating the effects of meditation on homeostatic regulation
have found improved function and effective allocation of inflam-
matory responses in novice normal meditators and in subjects
with major disease diagnoses (e.g., cancer) (Kabat-Zinn et al.,
1998; Davidson et al., 2003b; Smith, 2004; Carlson et al., 2007;
Pace et al., 2010). For example, Davidson and colleagues (2003b)
found thatMBSR produced significant increases in antibody titers
to influenza vaccine compared with those subjects in a wait-list
control group. Interestingly, the magnitude of increase in left-
sided anterior PFC activation in EEG predicted the magnitude
of antibody titer rise to the vaccine (Davidson et al., 2003b).
Pace and colleagues (2010) reported that after 6-weeks of com-
passion meditation practice, there were reduced innate cytokine
(IL-6) and subjective distress responses to a standardized lab-
oratory psychosocial stressor [Trier Social Stress Test (TSST)].
Moreover, individuals with meditation practice times above the
median exhibited lower TSST-induced IL-6 and POMS distress
scores.
EXTINCTION AND RECONSOLIDATION
The elimination of suffering, the end state of mindfulness prac-
tice is described often as “stillness of the mind” (Sanksrit: nir-
vana) (Buddhaghosa, 1991). The word “Nirvana” has literally
been translated as “blowing out” or “extinction.” In this con-
text, it refers to the extinction of the afflictions (Sanskrit: klesha),
which prevent happiness and flourishing. (Buddhaghosa, 1991;
Analayo, 2003; Bodhi, 1999). Maladaptive habits, distorted per-
ceptions, and biases accumulate through the conditioning or
reification of the NS, most of which are not accessible to con-
scious awareness. The narrative one creates about oneself in terms
of self-reflection or future projection becomes increasingly more
rigid as it is conditioned over time through a causal chain of
repetition (see Figure 1). Each trajectory of self-development rep-
resents a repeatedly reconstructed, reinforced, and reified NSwith
reliable patterns of subject-object relations that are relative stable
and accessed during self-specifying processes.
The S-ART framework suggests mindfulness acts as the mas-
ter self-regulatory mechanism for de-coupling and efficiently
integrating experiential and NS modes of processing with the
potential to transform the reified self from maladaptive trajec-
tories into more positive, adaptive trajectories. This form of
transformation is hypothesized to use circuitry associated with
extinction and reconsolidation. Biases of attention and memory
related to habitual distortions are proposed to be extinguished
and reconsolidated; however, the dosage and quality of medita-
tion time required for such change remains unclear. Although
change in constitutionally-based temperament or biological dis-
position is thought to be less likely than those aspects of self
that can be modulated by experience and training (Rothbart and
Ahadi, 1994; Kagan, 2003), there is evidence that conditioned fear
can be extinguished (Phelps et al., 2004). Exposure, extinction,
and reconsolidation are critical mechanisms for reducing habit-
ual anxiety and fear, and in facilitating therapeutic change in past
clinical models (Wells and Matthews, 1996; Bishop, 2007; Beck,
2008). Extinction does not erase the original association, but is a
process of novel learning that occurs when a memory (explicit or
implicit) is retrieved and the constellation of conditioned stimuli
that were previously conditioned to elicit a particular behavior
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or set of behavioral responses is temporarily labile and the asso-
ciations with each other are weakened through active or passive
means. Changing the association contingency of contextual cues
and what they mean results in a new memory trace. The new
memory trace involves re-consolidated associations of particular
contextual stimuli and its previous associations with new stim-
uli and behavior (Nader et al., 2000; Quirk and Mueller, 2008).
The behavioral expression of the new memory is then thought to
be in competition with the previously conditioned memory, with
particular pathological-oriented biological dispositions proving
to increase the time or number of trials necessary for extinc-
tion and sensitivity to old fear-based associations (Milad et al.,
2007). Extinction and reconsolidation can depend on numer-
ous factors, such as level-of-processing (Craik, 2002), emotional
salience (Kensinger and Schacter, 2005), the amount of attention
paid to a stimulus (Loftus, 1979), the expectations at encod-
ing regarding how memory will be assessed later (Frost, 1972),
or the reconsolidation-mediated strengthening of memory trace
(McGaugh, 2000). The closer in time the retrieval occurs to the
experience, the more likely weaker components of a memory
trace can be reconsolidated given the tendency for weak traces
to decay over time (i.e., forgetting). It has been reported that the
hypometabolic state of the practitioner may act to facilitate the
extinction process by creating novel parasympathetic associations
with previously anxiety-provoking stimuli (Cahn and Polich,
2006). The noting and labeling of sensory, cognitive, and emotive
states while in a hypometabolic system, such as during OM prac-
tice, is also likely to influence the nature of conditioned response
toward reconsolidation of more positive trajectories. Awareness
alone is proposed to change the conditioned response contin-
gency toward one’s patterns of behavior and feelings toward
oneself and others, although intentional cognitive processes may
also contribute. In association with positive reappraisal strate-
gies, the practitioner may reflect on a particular emotion and
decide if it is desirable or undesirable, warranted or unwarranted.
If one finds that one would like to change something about the
emotional state one is affected by, one can intentionally act to
transform the emotions. If, indeed, extinction proves to be a com-
mon mechanism for many types of habitual sensory, affective,
and motor processing in mindfulness training, one can begin to
redefine the solid boundaries and limited interactions between
automatic and controlled processing.
In both rodents and humans, the brain areas involved in
conditioning and extinguishing fear include the hippocampus,
amygdala, rhinal cortices, and VMPFC. Right DLPFC has also
been implicated in the extinction of aversive associations, while
right VLPFC has been implicated in non-aversive extinction
recall (Morgan and Ledoux, 1999). The cerebellum contributes
to simple associative learning, while the inferior temporal cor-
tices and dorsal striatum are responsible for conditioning and
habitualizing more complex sensory-affective-motor scripts and
schemas in visuo-spatial contexts (Buckner and Wheeler, 2001).
Structural connectivity between DLPFC and amygdala has also
been implicated in learned safety, suggesting effortful control
over expression of fear-related behavior (Pollak et al., 2010).
The VMPFC appears to modulate the amygdala response and
extinguish the expression of fear in this functional circuitry. In
fact, cortical thickness of the VMPFC has been shown to posi-
tively correlate with extinction recall, and functional connectivity
with the hippocampus appears to be related with learned safety
(Milad et al., 2007). The DMPFC and dorsal ACC have been
shown to be modulatory over the physiological and behavioral
expression of fear and thus, may be critical in extinction and
reconsolidation as well (Quirk et al., 2010). Dorsal ACC has
been shown to be positively correlated with sympathetic activ-
ity related to fear expression; whereas, ventral ACC (including
pACC and VMPFC) has been more associated with inhibition
of expression during extinction, and recall of extinction of fear
after extinguishing prior conditioned associations (Etkin et al.,
2011).
On a more cellular level, extinction and reconsolidation
research has focused on the molecular cascade of events that
follows experience and results in reorganization of long-term
memory storage. Some lines of investigation have demonstrated
that the presence of kinase activity, which persists in order to
maintain synaptic potentiation, may be indicative of newmemory
traces (Wallenstein et al., 2002). Similarly, labeling of epigenetic
or transcription factors related to expression of various genes
necessary for synaptic plasticity has also been shown to be indica-
tive of extinction and reconsolidation processes (Sweatt, 2009).
Several recent studies have shown that extinction learning in rats
can be accelerated and strengthened through modulation of these
molecular systems as well as through pharmacological noradren-
ergic and dopamine systems [e.g., D-cycloserine (DCS)] in the
mPFC (Quirk et al., 2010).
Although relatively few studies have explored this possibility,
there is some evidence that mindfulness-based practices involve
exposure, extinction, and reconsolidation processes [see (Holzel
et al., 2011a; Treanor, 2011) for review]. Multiple morphomet-
ric studies have demonstrated structural changes in the circuitry
related to extinction following mindfulness training of as lit-
tle as 8-weeks (Lazar et al., 2000; Holzel et al., 2008, 2011b;
Luders et al., 2009). Cross sectional studies comparing medi-
tators and non-meditators found greater GM concentration in
the hippocampus of meditators, suggesting enhanced circuitry
for extinction learning and retention (Holzel et al., 2008; Luders
et al., 2009). Aside from the changes noted above in memory-
related structures, thickness of the mPFC has been found to
be directly correlated with extinction retention after fear con-
ditioning, suggesting that its increase in size following training
might explain ability in meditators to modulate fear, a mecha-
nism that has yet to be fully explored (Milad et al., 2005; Ott
et al., 2010a; Holzel et al., 2011b). Moreover, GM concentration
in this region has been correlated with the amount of medita-
tion practice. Holzel and colleagues also recently demonstrated
that decreased perceived stress over the 8-weeks of MBSR pos-
itively correlated with decreased GM concentration in the right
amygdala (Holzel et al., 2011b). Previous research has shown that
such morphometric changes are associated with improved emo-
tion regulation and extinction of fear (Milad et al., 2005; Etkin
et al., 2011). Functional increases in these regions have also been
found during meditation or in the context of emotional probes,
suggest a strengthening of the circuitry involved in extinction
and a critical role for PFC-hippocampal dynamics in mediating
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changes in advanced practitioners. We further propose that the
posited reductions of negative ruminations about the self report-
edly due to mindfulness training (Ramel et al., 2004) may also be
mediated by the same functional extinction circuitry.
PROSOCIALITY: IMPROVING SOCIAL COGNITION
Humans are inherently social beings with a gifted ability for
social cognition—to understand others’ emotions, intentions,
and beliefs. Empathic forms of behavior, including empathy, sym-
pathy, and altruism, have been implicated in conceptual models
and theories about social cognition and associated experience
sharing and prosocial behavior (Hein and Singer, 2008; Eisenberg
et al., 2010; Zaki and Ochsner, 2012). Prosocial behavior is typ-
ically defined as voluntary behavior intended to benefit another
(Eisenberg et al., 2010). Major facets of prosociality and inter-
relationships include forms ofmentalizing and perspective taking.
For example, imagining the intentions of others has been called
“theory ofmind” (ToM). Empathy is distinct from ToMand refers
to our ability to share the experiences (emotions and sensations)
of others. It is believed that mindfulness practice can cultivate a
framework for interdependence of self in a social network and
include a cognitive framework supporting empathy and mental-
izing. In such cases, the conceptual form of meta-awareness (i.e.,
meta-cognition) allows one to disengage from the contents of
awareness and move toward the experiencing of an other’s sen-
sory or affective state (Decety and Chaminade, 2003; Singer and
Lamm, 2009).
Although prosociality has a biological basis and dispositional
differences in empathic responding and prosocial action exist
from early life onwards (Rothbart and Ahadi, 1994), patterns
of empathic responding and related prosocial behavior are rel-
atively plastic not only during childhood and adolescence, but
also during adulthood. Specifically, studies of adults have revealed
enhancements in functional activity of a social-cognitive network
supporting facets of mentalizing and empathy (Singer and Lamm,
2009; de Greck et al., 2012; Fan et al., 2011). This suggests that
some of the neural circuitry underlying empathy can be enhanced
through the practice of forms of mental training designed to
increase positive affect and prosocial behavior across the lifes-
pan. It is now commonly believed that empathic ability affects the
perception and affective style of others’ behavior toward oneself
(Eisenberg et al., 2010), mutually reinforcing the behavior toward
each other. Thus, social andmoral cognitions and behavior reflect
the nature and valence of self and others’ empathic behavior. The
S-ART model proposes that plasticity associated with prosocial-
ity may be indicative of self-transcendence, dissolving distinctions
between self and other and reflecting loving-kindness to both. A
greater sense of well-being is likely to depend upon this skill. In
fact, altruistic behavior has been associated with greater sense of
well-being and acceptance (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005), suggesting
all other stated mechanisms can be modulated by the cultivation
of prosocial and ethical behavior.
Brain areas that are involved in mentalizing include TPJ, TP,
AIC, precuneus, DMPFC, while the ACC, IFG, pSTS, and IPL
have been implicated more with prosociality and empathic con-
cern and experience sharing (Singer and Lamm, 2009; Frith and
Frith, 2012; Fan et al., 2011; Roy et al., 2012). Imagined self-action
relative to imagined experimenter action strongly activates IPL
(including TPJ), somatosensory cortex, and precuneus (Ruby and
Decety, 2001; Farrer et al., 2003), while Trancranial Magnetic
Stimulation (TMS) or lesions of the right TPJ has shown to dis-
rupt the sense of ownership or agency (Tsakiris et al., 2010) and
produce dissociative, out-of-body experiences (Blanke and Arzy,
2005). The OMPFC, has been shown to be specifically involved
in social modulation of reward value, while the mPFC and TPJ
have been shown to be more involved in mentalizing and ToM
(Frith and Frith, 2012). The right IPL is more often associated
with ToM, whereas the left IPL is more often involved in repre-
senting one’s own mental states (Decety and Chaminade, 2003).
The pSTS (including the TPJ) has been shown to be involved
in perceiving biological motion and orienting toward eye gaze
(Frith and Frith, 2012). The ACC has been shown to be more
involved in a supervisory role and deciphering conflicting infor-
mation. Posterior IFG has been shown to be involved in emotional
judgment and has been suggested to play a role in emotion recog-
nition, predicting emotion, andmirroring action (Frith and Frith,
2012). Fan and colleagues (2011) found that the dorsal ACC and
anterior mid-cingulate cortex (aMCC) were recruited more fre-
quently in the cognitive-evaluative form of empathy, while the
right AIC was found to be involved in the affective-perceptual
form of empathy only, and the left AIC was found to be active in
both forms of empathy. Singer and others propose the AIC serves
a dual role, a primary mapping of internal states with respect
to the self, and the predictive representations or simulation of
how the same emotional stimuli feel to others (Singer and Lamm,
2009).
One suggestion to account for overlap between self-other
neural substrates has been that understanding the intentions
of another is also likely to recruit processes underlying insight
into oneself. Interestingly when perceivers passively watch tar-
gets experiencing pain or reward, their own engagement of brain
areas associated with those states predicts later prosociality (Zaki
and Ochsner, 2012). This suggests that increased prosociality
may predict decreased differences in the intensity and local-
ization of neural activity in response to one’s own experience
in contrast to some target individual’s experience. This would
support a system of experience sharing or prosocial concern;
whereas mentalizing may engage separable neural systems. In
an experiment by Masten et al. (2010), mentalizing is shown
to increase future helping behavior, suggesting a distinct sys-
tem supporting prosocial behavior through experience sharing
and mentalizing. The prosocial system is indicated in Figure 2.
Research also indicates that positive social behaviors, specifi-
cally maternal nurturing (e.g., licking and grooming), induces
positive alterations in the brain and in behavior that promote
resilience (Champagne and Curley, 2008). Psychosocial factors,
such as decreased levels of denial and avoidant coping behavior,
increased levels of social engagement, positive emotion, and dis-
positional optimism have all been shown to promote resilience
(Feder et al., 2009). Collectively these data establish that our
brains are continuously shaped both functionally and structurally
by experience on which explicit training can capitalize to pro-
mote more adaptive brain functioning, especially with relation to
prosocial behavior.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 296 | 22
Vago and Silbersweig S-ART: Mechanisms of mindfulness
In support of the development of prosocial behavior, includ-
ing mentalizing, empathic concern, and experience sharing,
there have been a number of studies to suggest meditators
show increased activation of the prosociality circuitry over
non-meditators. Lutz and colleagues studied novice and expert
meditation practitioners that generated a non-referential loving-
kindness-compassion meditation state. To probe affective reac-
tivity, emotional and neutral sounds were presented during the
meditation and comparison periods. Concern for others culti-
vated during this form of meditation enhanced affective pro-
cessing particularly in response to sounds of distress, and this
response to emotional sounds was found to be modulated by the
degree of meditation training. The presentation of the emotional
sounds was associated with increased pupil diameter and dra-
matic increased activation of right AIC during meditation (vs.
rest) (Lutz et al., 2008a). During meditation, activation in right
AIC and mid-insula was greater during presentation of nega-
tive sounds than positive or neutral sounds in expert vs. novice
meditators. The strength of activation in insula was also asso-
ciated with self-reported intensity of the meditation for both
groups. Insula activity was also strongly coupled to heart-rate,
suggesting a relationship between generation of compassion and
cardiac function (Lutz et al., 2009). One case study of compassion
meditation showed similar activity in areas related to empathic
processing (Engstrom and Soderfeldt, 2010). These results and
other similar studies that demonstrated neural resonances in
shared experience [see (Zaki and Ochsner, 2012)] support the
role of limbic circuitry in emotion sharing. The comparison
between meditation vs. rest states between experts and novices
have shown increased activation in amygdala, right TPJ, and right
pSTS in response to all sounds, suggesting greater detection of,
and enhanced mentation in response to emotional human vocal-
izations for experts in comparison to novices during compassion
meditation. Interestingly, there was a link between expertise in
compassion and the activation in the right pSTS, a finding that is
consistent with previous research that indicated pSTS activity pre-
dicted self-reported altruism (Tankersley et al., 2007). Increased
activity in the amygdala may appear to be a counterintuitive find-
ing to traditional models of controlled emotion regulation, but
may be more indicative of regulatory states like equanimity.
Together these data indicate that the mental expertise to culti-
vate empathic behavior and positive emotion for others’ suffering
involves a network of prosociality and social cognition.
NON-ATTACHMENT AND DE-CENTERING
One of the advanced outcomes or aspects of insight, developed
through mindfulness-based meditation practice is the realization
of “no-self,” which stems from the Buddhist teachings describ-
ing the nature impermanence (see Section “Defining meditation
and mindfulness from the historical perspective”). This form of
insight demonstrates that there is no truly existing self (i.e., sub-
ject) that continues through life without change and provides the
practitioner with the critical distinction between the phenomeno-
logical experience of oneself and one’s thoughts, emotions, and
feelings that appear “thing-like” (Varela et al., 1991). This real-
ization of impermanence of all “thing-like” objects including
the self is also described as a “release from mental fixations,”
or non-attachment (Sanskrit: vira¯ga) (Sahdra et al., 2010). In
this sense, mindfulness is a relational process. Mindfulness not
only helps to support awareness of the self, it transcends the
self-object duality by supporting the realization of the self to be
co-dependent with the relations to objects in experience, result-
ing in a characterization of self as empty and groundless. There
may be clear benefits to developing increased awareness of our
selves and environment, but the platform from which sustained
transformation and insight arise is one that includes the rela-
tional quality the practitioner brings toward noting and labeling
the modalities of experience—one that is free of the choosing,
evaluating, or projecting that is sometimes described as “grasping,
aversion, and delusion” (Salzberg, 2011).
Decentering, described as “reperceiving” in past models of
mindfulness (Shapiro et al., 2006), is a therapeutic process that
introduces a “space between one’s perception and response”
allowing the individual to disengage or “step outside” one’s
immediate experience in an observer perspective (i.e., fly on the
wall) for insight and analysis of one’s habitual patterns of emo-
tion and behavior. Decentering may not necessarily be unique to
mindfulness, as it is described in other therapeutic contexts as
the “observing self” (Deikman, 1982; Fletcher and Hayes, 2005),
or “self-as-witness” (Damasio, 2010). Decentering is compared
to clinical constructs such as defusion or psychological distanc-
ing (Fletcher and Hayes, 2005; Ayduk and Kross, 2010). It also
refers to a process of deautomatization (Ayduk and Kross, 2010),
in which there is an undoing of automatic processes that con-
trol perception/interpretation. These processes are described to
enhance a trait-like ability to shift focus of attention at will, and
inhibit elaborative processing of thoughts/feelings. For example,
repetitive thinking “I am worthless” vs. recognizing “I am hav-
ing the thought that I am worthless.” The fusion of self and
negative thoughts along with rumination has been shown to
play a critical role in exacerbating negative affect, maintaining
or heightening anxiety, and increasing cognitive vulnerability to
psychopathology (Smith and Alloy, 2009). The insight achieved
through mindfulness-based practices provides awareness that
one’s thoughts are subjective and transient in nature (Safran and
Segal, 1990), thus facilitating non-attachment and subsequently
improving satisfaction with life, well-being and interpersonal
functioning (Sahdra et al., 2010).
Laboratory studies of mindfulness-based meditation practices
have yet to identify biological correlates for the psychological
constructs of decentering and non-attachment. However, the S-
ART framework suggests a significant role for them in relation
to practice effects and development of meta-awareness. Some of
the extant data suggest functional dynamics between the self-
networks may account for the decentering mechanism by which
mindfulness training promotes flexibility of information pro-
cessing between autobiographical and experiential awareness.
For example, one study found that the DMPFC is deactivated
and negatively coupled to PIC during interoceptive awareness
(Farb et al., 2012). Additionally, Farb et al. (2012) found that
DMPFC-insula connectivity was absent during exteroceptive
focus. Another study investigating adept Zen meditators (in com-
parison to novices) found stronger connectivity between DMPFC
and IPL, an area with both narrative and EPS involvement
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(Taylor et al., 2012). These data suggest a mechanism by which
DMPFC may act to integrate narrative and experiential informa-
tion, sustain positive activation in interoceptive areas or decouple
from them without suppression. Other studies have emphasized
areas from the integrative fronto-parietal network as critical for
the type of perspective taking required for decentering or non-
attachment. For example, one study demonstrated a strong role
for dACC inmediating the conscious appraisal of emotional expe-
rience (Critchley et al., 2004), while another study showed strong
activity in dACC and DMPFC together (Holzel et al., 2007).
Future studies will have to clarify the neurobiologicalmechanisms
behind these critical processes.
CONCLUSIONS, CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Rather than focusing on reducing mindfulness down to a single
unitary dimension of cognition, we have attempted to illustrate
the complexity of mechanisms by which mindfulness functions
to reduce suffering and create a sustainable healthy mind using a
framework of self-processing. Suffering is described using both
a traditional Buddhist perspective and a contemporary model
for psychopathology. Biased self-processing is demonstrated to
be a common target for traditional Buddhist and contempo-
rary conceptual models of mindfulness, such that discrepancies
in operationalizing mindfulness can find common mechanisms
by which mindfulness-based mental training functions. In our
attempts to create a unified framework for understanding the
mechanisms by which mindfulness functions, we operational-
ize the concept in two ways: (1) as a broadly defined method
for developing a multidimensional skillset that ultimately leads
to a reduction in self-processing biases and creates a sustainable
healthy mind; (2) A continuous discriminative attentional capac-
ity that we refer to as “mindful awareness”—a skill amongst a
set of other skills developed through specific meditation prac-
tices. Our interpretation of mindfulness is thus provided by an
empirical framework of S-ART to illustrate a method for becom-
ing aware of [and familiar with] the conditions which cause [and
remove] distortions or biases in the individual’s construction
of his or her external or internal experience. Through training
in FA, OM, and EE styles of meditation, a sustainable healthy
mind is proposed to be supported—reducing maladaptive emo-
tions and cognitions common to most ordinary experience, such
as lustful desire, greed, anger, hatred, worry, etc., increasing
pro-social dispositions (e.g., compassion, empathy, and forgive-
ness) toward self and other, reducing attachments to thoughts
and feelings, and removing biases inherent in habitual forms of
cognition.
The S-ART framework outlines specific neural networks of
self-specifying and NS processing along with an integrative
fronto-parietal network that is proposed to be supported by
six neurocognitive processes developed in mindfulness-based
meditation practices. These processes are conceptualized as a
skillset proposed to facilitate the integration of self-experience
from both top-down and bottom-up mechanisms. It will be
critical to examine how these networks change longitudinally
through meditation training using advanced multivariate statis-
tical network analyses that also consider changes in attentional
and cognitive bias, reduction of psychological symptoms, and
first-person self-reports in the neuroimaging acquisition pro-
tocols. A neurobiological model (Figure 2) is used to illustrate
functional distinctions between the networks; however, gradients
of non-conscious and conscious processing must be considered,
as functional specification is likely to be graded in nature. The
skillset identified herein is an attempt to dismantle the prac-
tices that cultivate mindfulness into component mechanisms so
that the contemplative sciences can more precisely investigate the
dispositional differences amongst practitioners of mindfulness-
based meditation practices and practice-specific changes can be
objectively correlated with first-person experience.
The challenge in this emerging field continues to be dis-
ambiguating the concept of mindfulness from more common
usage of the term, and eliminating the “black box” or singu-
lar approach to studying meditation. Amongst all the enthusi-
asm for research and clinical application of mindfulness, there
is much foundational basic science and vital clinical trials that
remain to be implemented. It is likely that future research in
the contemplative sciences will provide a developmental trajec-
tory of different S-ART-specific subcomponents and individual
differences across duration and frequency of practice. Although
research is beginning to demonstrate the state effects related
to a number of contemplative practices, the continued practice
of FA and OM meditation induces trait changes that have yet
to be adequately and objectively measured longitudinally across
progress as a practitioner. It is assumed that one begins receiv-
ing benefits of the practices immediately upon initial practice;
however, explicit durations of practice and dose effects are issues
of concern that should not go unnoticed. As Davidson (2010)
emphasizes, it remains uncertain whether study participants can
reliably report on the quality and/or magnitude of their practice.
These issues are similar for measurement of intensity or quality
of practice in long-term practitioners as well. It is also critical
that the emerging field examine the adverse effects of long-term
practice—effects that typically go unnoticed in clinical trials, but
are more prevalent in longer retreats and in practitioners that
may or may not have a predisposition toward developing psy-
chopathology. Constructing objective standards for determining
extent of expertise and proficiency in a particular meditation
technique beyond reported hours of formal practice (i.e., time on
the cushion) will have to be developed to support self-reported
facets of mindfulness.
It is our hope that this framework will help clarify adaptive
mind-brain-body interactions and their therapeutic relevance in
the general population and across neuropsychiatric disorders.
Although past reviews have focused on the process of mindful-
ness from a psychological perspective, we have attempted to focus
on self-processing using a neurocognitive lens, and distinguish
between contemporary and historical interpretations of mindful-
ness. The S-ART framework also has attempted to disambiguate
the term, mindfulness, from other Buddhist concepts (e.g., equa-
nimity, clarity) and integrate them into the multidimensional
skillset that is strengthened through FA, OM, and EE practices.
Future work that builds off of S-ART and the process models
provided will help provide a systematic way to deconstruct the
heterogeneity of meditation practices into component parts and
illustrate a representative map for the underlying processes of
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self-transformation. By revealing the neural circuitry and
further identifying endophenotypes for mindfulness skill devel-
opment, the field of contemplative science may help to bet-
ter predict clinical outcomes and potential targets for the
development of biologically based diagnostic and therapeu-
tic strategies for those suffering with mental illness and clar-
ify our understanding related to the nature of mind and
consciousness.
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